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Executive Summary 
I. Introduction 
With a rapidly growing population and labor force, Swaziland is concerned about the 
need to create employment opportunities. Agriculture provides 34% of the formal sector 
employment with the private sector providing about two-thirds of the total agricultural sector 
employment. The demand for formal sector employment is estimated to increase from 75,000 
in 1991 to 82,000 by 1995 and the private commercial farms will be able to increase their 
demand for labor from 25,000 to 40,000. Formal employment in the public sector, has 
stagnated, however, and recorded negative growth in the late eighties. The demand for Swazi 
workers in South African mines has also declined and the country's industrial base may shrink 
with the possible shift of several multinational companies from Swaziland to South Africa. These 
developments place an even greater burden on the agricultural sector, small businesses and self-
employment to create jobs in the future. 
Small farm horticultural and poultry production have traditionally been considered as low 
income agricultural enterprises. These two subsectors are important, however, because of their 
large employment and income generating opportunities, especially for rural women. The country 
enjoys favorable production conditions for growing many sub-tropical and temperate horticultural 
products and for producing disease free poultry. Production technology and inputs can be easily 
imported from neighboring South Africa. A domestic market is available for import substitution 
production unlike several other Sub-Saharan African countries that are already self-sufficient in 
these products. To a lesser extent, there are also opportunities for exports to neighboring African 
countries. But developing production and marketing systems for these two subsectors that 
produce economic returns that are attractive compared to non-farm employment represents a 
formidable challenge. 
The objective of this study was to analyse the potential for growth in these two 
subsectors. It is part of a series of case studies conducted by The Ohio State University through 
a project with the African Bureau, USAID, Washington. It summarizes the marketing and 
financial strategies used by the various agents operating in these two subsectors in Swaziland. 
Their prospects for effectively substituting for imports to service domestic markets and to 
contribute to exports are discussed and the policy implications are identified. A modified 
subsector framework was used in the study to examine the commodity and fmancial flows that 
link producers with consumers. 
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II. The Bane and Blessing of a Small Country with a Large Neighbor 
Many developing nations have natural trade barriers in the form of high transportation 
and transaction costs which constrain their ability to sell in distant markets, but also protect them 
against more efficient foreign competitors. Swaziland, however, has a more complicated 
situation. It is close to a large, more modern economy in South Africa. Futhermore, by being 
part of the South African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common Monitary Authority (CMA), 
it follows regional monetary and trade policies. This means that the country's producers receive 
some protection from cheaper foreign suppliers, but they must compete with more efficient South 
African producers. This situation provides opportunities for but also constrains the development 
of the horticultural and poultry subsectors and affects the policies that can be employed to 
stimulate development. 
This situation has four important implications for Swazi horticultural and poultry 
producers. First, the technology and inputs appropriate for import substitution production in 
Swaziland are available as close by as South Africa, and they have to be adopted by Swazi 
producers if they hope to be competitive. Second, strong management and organizational skills 
are crucial for Swazi producers so they can adopt these modern production systems. This 
presents a challenge for many small farmers. Third, the low cost high quality demands of 
domestic markets imply that there are limited opportunities for "learning by doing" in which 
Swazi producers initially supply lower quality domestic markets, then expand into increasingly 
competitive export markets. Fourth, Swazi producers need to carefully identify possible niche 
markets in which they are somewhat protected from lower cost foreign producers. For the 
horticultural subsector, these niches may be most logically found during the winter season when 
South Africa production is reduced. 
ill. Production and Marketing Structure of the Horticultural and Poultry Subsectors 
The production system for horticultural products consists of a few large commercial 
farms and several small farms. In general, the participants specialize in only one activity such 
as production, marketing or exporting. Very few operations are totally or even partially 
integrated. The majority of transactions are effected through spot markets. The lack of 
integration implies that the subsector is still in its infancy compared to other major SubSaharan 
African exporting countries. Marketing services are provided by retailers, wholesalers, hawkers 
and market women linked to several municipal markets, and the wholesale Swaziland Fresh 
Produce Market (SFPM). A limited amount of low value horticultural crops are exported and 
exports to South Africa are significant during the winter months. However, the country is far 
from fully exploiting its full potential in this niche market. A few commercial farmers have been 
contracted to grow minivegetables for European markets. 
The poultry subsector is also bimodal. There are a few large broiler and layer operations, 
usually owned or operated by whites, employing modern technology with operational costs low 
enough to compete with South African producers. A large number of smaller producers supply 
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households and local markets. Domestic production represents only a fraction of total 
consumption, especially for high quality eggs and broilers. However, unlike horticulture, there 
are no strong seasonal production patterns so Swaziland has no clear seasonal advantage relative 
to South Africa. Also unlike horticulture, there are no wholesale markets for poultry. Point of 
lay pullets, day old chicks, and most feed and equipment for layer and broiler operations are 
imported. 
IV. Financial Markets for Horticultural and Poultry Subsectors 
Swaziland does not have a well-developed fmancial system with the capacity to effectively 
screen rural borrowers, monitor loans, and recover most of the funds lent. Most of the 
agricultural lending is done by the Swaziland Development and Saving Bank (SDSB) with donors 
being an important source of funds. Formal bank loans are available only to the largest 
horticultural and poultry producers. As a result, much of the funding for these two subsectors 
is equity capital and informal loans. Of the total loans and advances made in 1992 by formal 
banking institutions, the agricultural share was only 8.4%. Roughly two-thirds of the lending 
by banks to agriculture is done using the overdraft system. Even the overdrafts are usually fully 
collateralized so farmers are at a disadvantage if they have few assets acceptable as collateral. 
The four private commercial banks viewed small farmer lending as costly and risky, and none 
saw the Central Bank guarantee programs as effective means to reduce lending risk. The 
majority of the formal lending to smaller scale producers is done by SDSB. Currently, the SDSB 
is experimenting with group loans to vegetable growers, and the repayment rates are expected 
to be higher than loans to individual maize growers. The group lending approach is reported to 
have increased access to formal loans for women who otherwise need collateral and their 
husbands' consent to secure loans. SDSB area officers have also been involved with the CAPM 
project steering committee in assessing crop performance and in marketing. 
The SBGT has the potential to become an important source of fmancial services for these 
two subsectors, but its subsidiary, the Growth Trust Corporation (GTC), has made few loans 
to the poultry or horticultural producers. Of the 909 clients serviced from October 1992 to May 
1994, only 23 and 38 were in poultry and horticulture, respectively. Of the total volume of loans 
issued in 1994, loans to poultry and horticulture accounted for only two and four percent, 
respectively. Poultry and horticultural loans recorded repayment rates of 89 and 83 %, 
respectively, compared to 95% for other sectors. It would be difficult for the GTC to make more 
poultry and horticultural loans to small producers because the transaction and risk costs involved 
could not be covered with current interest rates. The rates cannot be increased, however, beyond 
the current 33% without potentially attracting a more risky clientele. 
Approximately 13 NGOs are actively engaged in promoting horticultural production and 
seven in poultry. There is also a fair amount of informal fmance used in these subsectors. 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCAs) are commonly found among market women 
selling horticultural products. Suppliers credit is also commonly granted by producers that supply 
hotels, supermarkets, and by retailers to a small group of their regular clientele. However, small 
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producers seldom extend credit to their buyers but are mandated to sell on consignment when 
trading through market agents at SFPM. The few existing outgrower schemes seldom provide 
credit or other production inputs. In the poultry subsector, a fair amount of suppliers credit is 
granted to customers who make large purchases and have well established business relationships. 
Large farmers are able to obtain 15-30 day credit from feed suppliers. Hotels and supermarkets 
usually purchase from sources that allow them to pay within 30 days of delivery, but smaller 
wholesalers/retailers normally have to pay cash. There were no reports of forward contracting 
in which the purchaser provides funding for products to be delivered at a future date. 
V. Conclusions and Policy Implications: 
Many of the economic development problems faced by Swaziland must be dealt with 
regionally because they involve economic relations with South Africa. But Swaziland needs to 
evaluate what it can effectively do to stimulate horticultural and poultry production if it is to 
expand employment in these two subsectors of agriculture. Being an importer of some fresh 
fruit, vegetables and poultry products means that a market exists if local production can compete 
in price, quality and reliability. The difficulty for Swazi producers is that South Africa supplies 
Swaziland with many products at competitive prices. Although Swaziland has ready access to 
many of the production technologies and inputs used in South Africa, transportation costs and 
limitations in entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities retard their adoption. Efforts must be 
directed at providing good support services for these two subsectors, and exploiting market 
niches where Swazi producers can be competetive. 
The following areas should be explored for possible government action, and some may 
be appropriate for action by the private sector and/ or donor assistance. 
1. Provision of Public Goods 
The government needs to concentrate on providing those public goods that clearly fall 
within the public sector and are helpful to all producers within the sub sectors. The primary areas 
for government action are the following: 
• Research and extension. Research is required to identify the enterprises, specific 
crop varieties, and livestock and poultry breeds most appropriate for Swazi 
production conditions, and for which there is the best domestic and export market 
potential. Some research will have to be conducted in Swaziland but the country 
should be able to utilize much research done in South Africa and elsewhere. This 
information must be accurate and timely so producers develop confidence that 
government offices will be good sources of advice when they wish to make 
investment decisions or face production and marketing problems. Carefully 
targeted support for extension is required so that specific problems of these 
subsectors are addressed. Developmental activities such as the USAID CAPM 
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project and the U.S ./Israeli poultry project need to be internalized so their 
continuity is assured. 
• Grades and standards. The government should support the development and enforce-
ment of grades and quality standards to prevent inferior quality products from 
entering domestic and foreign markets and creating a bad image for producers. 
• Privatization. The government must be selective in choosing what to actually operate 
as a public enterprise versus simply regulating the actions of private agents. For 
example, perhaps the government hatchery should be leased or sold to private 
agents to avoid the current situation in which it sits idle because government 
funds are unavailable to acquire a new breeding flock. 
• NAMBOARD. The government needs to carefully assess the recommendations to be 
made in the Coopers & Lybrand report contracted by NAMBOARD. The 
functions and operations of the Swaziland Fresh Produce Market may need to be 
restructured so it can more effectively assist the marketing of fresh fruits and 
vegetables. Furthermore, NAMBOARD itself may have to be redesigned so it is 
assigned a mission more consistent with its capacity. Currently it operates more 
as a taxing body than as an effective agency for trade regulation. 
2. Special Studies and Training 
Some special studies should be sponsored or conducted by the government to clarify 
specific issues important to the horticultural and poultry subsectors. 
• Enterprise returns. Analysis is incomplete about the returns that have been or can 
be expected from certain enterprises. For example, there is limited good data for 
use in making robust estimates about what farmers can actually earn by 
participating in joint processsing and marketing of vegetables as is being 
attempted in the CAPM project. There are no good analyses of the possible 
returns to be earned from various sizes of poultry operations. Poultry production 
in South Africa and elsewhere suggest there are large economies of scale. 
However, small scale cooperative operations, such as the Shibani cooperative, 
may achieve good returns by combining centralized feed purchasing with 
individual small flock production units. A franchisable egg production system 
might be developed that the private sector could duplicate wherever appropriate 
niche markets exist. 
• Subcontracting and outgrower schemes. A study is needed to clarify the possibilities 
and constraints for the greater use of subcontracting and outgrower schemes in 
these two subsectors. They combine the advantages of large farmer expertise and 
access to markets with small farmer labor and land. The creditworthiness of small 
farmer subcontractors is often enhanced because of their assured access to 
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markets. This study should identify if there are ways for the government to 
facilitate the greater use of these production systems. The reasons for the inability 
of the CAPM project to identify a contractor to link with the project fanners need 
to be carefuly examined in this study. 
• Management training. The lack of good management was consistently identified in 
our interviews as one of the chief constraints of Swazi agriculture. Additional 
management training could be an important contribution made by the government. 
This training might be particularly effective for persons entering into outgrowing 
schemes, and might influence large producers to select outgrower systems rather 
than use hired labor to expand their own production. 
3. Stimulating Investment in the Subsectors 
• One-stop investment center. Much of the equity capital and expertise required for 
large integrated poultry production systems must come from foreign sources. 
Swaziland needs a one-stop investment center to facilitate investments and attract 
foreign investors. Attracting investment is increasingly competitive and many 
countries are developing one-stop investment centers to improve their chances of 
success. This is especially important with the improvement of the image of South 
Africa. 
• Project assistance. The best alternative for increasing foreign investments in 
horticulture and poultry will likely be through encouraging South African firms 
to set up subsidiary operations and joint ventures in Swaziland. A second 
alternative is to encourage local medium-sized entrepreneurs, many of whom will 
probably be white farmers with land and other resources, to develop outgrower 
and contracting schemes for horticulture and poultry. Either alternative will 
require assisting individual firms to resolve production and marketing problems. 
USAID funded projects, such as EPADU in Uganda and KEDS in Kenya, offer 
ideas about how the private sector can be assisted to expand horticultural exports. 
4. Formal Sector Lending 
The formal banking system must be cautious about lending to these two subsectors 
because of the high transaction costs and risks involved. Three strategies should be pursued to 
make formal lending more viable. 
• Outgrower schemes. If contract grower schemes can be expanded so that small 
farmers are linked with large fanners and/or marketing agents, lenders may be 
naturally inclined to lend to small farmers because of their improved access to 
markets. 
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• Small scale poultry cooperatives. If detailed analysis of the Shibani Cooperative 
demonstrates its fmancial viability, this scheme might be replicated throughout the 
country wherever a large enough niche market exists. Lenders might find that the 
risk of lending in this type of scheme is reduced enough so one commercial bank 
might make long term loans for the buildings and equipment, and the SBGT or 
another lender might make working capital loans for the cooperative and the 
individual members. SBGT or other lenders might also be able to develop 
attractive lease/purchase programs for simple equipment, machinery and vehicles 
for which there is a strong second-hand market. 
• Small scale slaughtering plant. The Development Bank of Southern Africa has 
provided seed capital for a South African NGO to experiment with designing a 
small scale poultry slaughtering plant to be prefabricated in a used sea freight 
container, then installing it in a market town where the current volume of 
slaughter may make it feasible to upgrade to a more modem processing plant. If 
this design proves to be financially sound, it might be copied in Swaziland as a 
type of agribusiness that the SBGT or another lender might fmd attractive to 
finance. 
5. Producer Associations 
At some point in the evolution of these two suscetors, producer associations may be use-
ful. Formal or informal associations of farmers could assist with group purchasing of inputs in 
bulk, negotiating marketing contracts, advertising their products, buying and using machinery 
and equipment, and sharing costs such as veterinary services. Secondly, such associations could 
work on behalf of producers to assure quality of production. 
6. Investments in Human Capital 
A complaint frequently reported in our interviews was the limited managerial capacity 
in the country. The documents reviewed also describe the country's lack of investment in human 
capital. This is probably the country's greatest long-term problem and must be addressed because 
it influences the possibility of successfully competing in any subsector. Borrowers from fmancial 
institutions often resist training because they perceive that their primary need is a loan. Yet a 
borrower may receive greater long-term benefits from the training provided by a lending 
institution than from loans. 
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IMPORT SUBSTITUTION AND EXPORT PROMOTION: PROSPECTS FOR THE 
HORTICULTURAL AND POULTRY SUBSECTORS IN SWAZILAND 
by 
Richard L. Meyer and Geetha Nagarajan 
I. Introduction 
Swaziland is a landlocked country in Southern Africa with an area of 17,360 square 
kilometers supporting a population of 0.8 million. GDP per capita income is estimated at US 
$827 and the annual inflation rate is 8.8%. However, recent changes in South Africa and 
recession in the region have significantly affected the Swaziland economy. For the first time 
since independence, the country experienced a budget deficit beginning in 1993, and the real 
annual GDP growth rate has declined from 2.1 in the 1987-1991 period to -1.9 in the 1992-1993 
period1 (Union Bank, 1993). The economy is market oriented and heavily based on agricultural 
and forestry exports, remittances and customs revenues. 
The country is not self-sufficient in food production. The average annual growth rate in 
the food self-sufficiency ratio was reported to be -0.5 for the period 1988-1992. This is reflected 
in the country's position as a net importer of major food commodities including poultry and 
horticultural products. Nearly 90% of the fruits, vegetables and poultry products consumed are 
imported from South Africa. A total of 2,668 tons of eggs (value: E 2.1 million) and 3,048 tons 
of frozen chicken (value: E16.6 million) were imported into Swaziland in 1992 from South 
Africa (NAMBOARD, 1992).2 A net total of 21.3 thousand metric tons (value: E5.1 million) 
of fresh fruits and vegetables were imported for local consumption in 1992.3 The main staple 
of maize has also been imported due to drought and rising population. Indeed, food and live 
animals account for 18% of the total officially registered volume of imports into the country. 
Two reasons contribute to the country's dependence on South Africa: (i) faced with an 
embargo on its trade, South Africa is alleged to have dumped relatively cheap, good quality food 
products into Swaziland thereby making Swazi products uncompetitive, and (ii) there are few 
comparative advantages in producing most products in Swaziland, and the lack of infrastructure 
1 Based on 1985 consumer price index. 
2 The Emalagini is the local currency and is on par with the South African Rand. The 
current exchange is about US$ 1.00 = E3.52. 
3 A total of 21.9 thousand metric tons were reported to be imported into Swaziland but 
about 0.6 thousand metric tons were reported to be reexported to Mozambique and South Africa. 
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facilities and management skills inhibit production on a large scale to meet local demand. 
However, Swaziland is a net exporter of citrus products. The exports of fresh and canned citrus 
fruits have been estimated at E91.1 million accounting for 5.8% of the total exports from the 
country in 1991. Sugar remains the major export earner (31% of total export earnings) followed 
by wood pulp (15% of total). Although the ratio of debt service to export earnings declined from 
7.15% in 1990 to 3.17% in 1991, the trade deficit tripled from E86 million in 1990 to E257 
million in 1992 (Union Bank, 1993). 
With an expanding labor force growing at the rate of 2.4% per year and annual popula-
tion growth of 3.5%, the country is concerned about the need to create employment opportuni-
ties. Agriculture is by far the major sector as it provides 34% of the formal sector employment, 
with the private sector providing 68% of the total agricultural sector employment. Private com-
mercial farms on Title Deed Lands (TDL) provide employment for 25,000 of the total 75,000 
formal sector employees. It is estimated that the demand for formal sector employment will in-
crease from 75,000 in 1991 to 82,000 by 1995 and the private commercial farms will be able 
to increase their demand for labor from 25,000 to 40,000. Formal employment in the public 
sector, however, has stagnated and recorded a negative growth rate (Noman, 1993; Duncan, 
1987). Therefore, the formal sector, both private and public, has been unable to create adequate 
employment so the informal sector has filled the gap. Furthermore, demand for Swazi workers 
in South African mines has declined from 20,000 in 1988 to 17,000 in 1990. The potential de-
cline in the industrial base due to the possible shift of several multinational companies from 
Swaziland to South Africa would place an even greater burden on employment creation in the 
nonformal agricultural sector, in small businesses and in self-employment. 
Within agriculture, crop and livestock sales account for only 12 and 26%, respectively, 
of total cash and inkind income of rural households; the majority of family income has been 
derived from remittances and non-farm occupations (Duncan, 1987). Small farmer horticultural 
crops and poultry production have traditionally been considered as low income and nonformal 
agricultural enterprises. But with the growing economic distress in the country, it is imperative 
to study the potential of these two subsectors to contribute to employment creation and to a re-
duction in the balance of payment problem. These two subsectors are particularly important be-
cause of the large employment and income generating opportunities they may offer for women. 
The country enjoys favorable agricultural production conditions for growing many sub-tropical 
and temperate horticultural products and for producing disease free poultry. Production technolo-
gy and inputs can be easily imported from neighboring South Africa. These subsectors, there-
fore, have the potential to effectively substitute for imports to serve the domestic markets and, 
to a lesser extent, export to neighboring African countries. But developing production and 
marketing systems for these two subsectors with economic returns that are attractive compared 
to non-farm employment represents a formidable challenge for several reasons that will be dis-
cussed later. 
This study is part of a series of case studies conducted by The Ohio State University 
through a project with the African Bureau, USAID, Washington. It summarizes the marketing 
and fmancial strategies used by the various agents operating in the horticultural and poultry 
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subsectors in Swaziland. The prospects for these subsectors to effectively substitute for imports 
to service domestic markets are discussed and the policy implications are identified. A modified 
subsector framework was followed in the study to examine the commodity and financial flows 
that link producers with consumers through various marketing agents (Nagarajan and Meyer, 
1994). The methodology was limited to reviewing the studies already available, and 
supplementing them with interviews conducted during June and July 1994 with key participants 
in the subsectors. 4 The interviewees included several exporters, wholesalers, retailers, 
commission agents, producers and hotels/restaurants that purchase large volumes of horticultural 
and poultry products, and agents who provide financial, transportation and other support services 
including market information. The major fresh produce markets in Pretoria and Durban were 
visited to collect information from South African exporters/importers to Swaziland. In addition, 
the agents dealing with the Indian ethnic market in Durban were interviewed to assess the 
potential for expanding Swaziland exports of tomatoes and other Asian vegetables into that 
market, especially during the June to September production off-season in South Africa. 
The next section of the paper discusses the implications for Swaziland of being located 
adjacent to a large and economically powerful neighbor, South Africa. This is followed by an 
analysis of the production and marketing systems for the horticultural and poultry subsectors, 
and an examination of their ability to serve alternate markets. Financial services available for 
the two subsectors and policy implications conclude the paper. 
II. The Bane and Blessing of a Small Country with a Large Neighbor 
Many developing nations have a natural trade barrier in the form of high transportation 
and transaction costs which constrain their ability to sell in distant markets, but also serve as a 
form of protection against more efficient foreign competitors. Swaziland, however, has a more 
complicated situation. First, it faces the problem of competition which is typical of a small 
developing country located adjacent to a large, more developed neighbor. Second, by being part 
of a regional economic grouping, the South African Customs Union (SACU) and the Common 
Monitory Authority (CMA), it follows regional monetary and trade policies that have provided 
some protection from non-regional producers. This combination of circumstances means that the 
country's producers receive some protection from cheaper foreign suppliers, but they must 
compete with South African producers many of whom benefitted from a variety of incentives 
4 The analysis presented here represents the authors' best professional judgements based on 
the analysis conducted during this brief period. The CAPM project of USAID has been the 
subject of several in-depth studies. The most recent one was conducted in mid-1993 over a two 
month period. The present project strategy of working through farmer cooperatives was 
developed at that time. Our analysis emphasizes the possible role of contract farming in 
resolving horticultural production and marketing problems. That approach was attempted but 
abandoned by the project when no producer or exporter was located to contract with local small 
producers. 
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and subsidies The economic challenge this poses for Swazi producers is briefly discussed in this 
section to demonstrate how this situation at once provides opportunities for and constrains the 
development of the horticultural and poultry subsectors in Swaziland. It also affects the policies 
that can be effectively employed in Swaziland to stimulate development. 
1. Product Pricing in South Africa and Its Impact on Swaziland 
The total production of most agricultural commodities in Swaziland is small relative to 
the total size of the South African market. Likewise, the amount of any product that Swaziland 
purchases from South Africa tends to be fairly small relative to total South African production. 
Therefore, with the exception of certain commodities during specific times of the year, 
Swaziland is largely a price taker of prices formed in South Africa. This implies that the 
aggregate sales or purchases of Swazi producers and consumers are too small to materially 
influence South African prices for products traded in fairly competitive markets. For this reason, 
the import prices in Swaziland for many South African products can be expected to be close to 
South African wholesale prices plus the cost of transportation and handling to get the products 
to Swaziland. Likewise, the prices received by Swazi exporters are likely to be close to the 
wholesale price in South Africa minus transportation and handling costs to get the products to 
the South African markets. 
The prices that are formed in South African markets are subject to a variety of 
government interventions. Since the 1930s, the government has intervened extensively in 
agricultural pricing and marketing. The original Marketing Act of 1937, and subsequent 
legislation, provided for statutory marketing schemes, managed by control boards, designed to 
regulate the domestic market, to control imports and exports, to promote demand, and to support 
research (van Zyl). Twenty-two control boards have been established with twenty still in 
existence. A single-channel fixed price scheme, for example, has been used to exercise 
monopoly powers with a system of pre-announced prices for maize. Maize is the country's most 
important field and food crop, and one of the most important intermediate inputs for the 
livestock and poultry industry. The country also supplies a significant amount of the maize needs 
of Botswana, Lesotho, Namibia, and Swaziland. As another example, eggs were included in 
surplus-removal schemes in which the board intervenes to maintain minimum prices. Fresh 
produce, on the other hand, has been subject to relatively less regulation, except that much of 
the market is managed by 15 National Fresh Produce Markets (NFPMs) operated by local 
municipalities. Although chain stores and wholesalers increasingly purchase products directly 
from producers, the NFPMs are still important for price determination. 
These policies, coupled with import substitution industrialization for industry, have pro-
duced a number of positive results. For example, they are credited with helping develop a mo-
dem production system backed up with a relatively sophisticated agricultural research capacity. 
Production has grown and some products, such as citrus, have been able to successfully pene-
trate foreign markets. In addition, the country has developed a fairly good transport and commu-
nication system which help make it competitive in international markets. However, these policies 
employed a large amount of subsidies and introduced great distortions into the agricultural econ-
5 
omy. It is now recognized that the efforts to try to reach food self-sufficiency resulted in huge 
budgetary costs, and small farm agriculture was largely ignored in the process. Cheap credit, 
sometimes at negative interest rates, and liberal tax breaks, which allowed capital equipment to 
be written off in the year of purchase, contributed to an expansion in farm size, to a substitution 
of capital for labor, and to high levels of farm indebtedness (Thirtle, von Bach and van Zyl). 
The resulting international uncompetitiveness of agriculture led to a number of reforms 
beginning in the early 1980s including a reduction in the use of price controls, a shift to more 
market-based pricing systems, the removal of some subsidies, major debt write-offs for farmers 
and cooperatives, and the replacement of some quantitative controls on trade with tariffs (van 
Zyl). Additional policy changes are being considered, especially in light of the GATT agree-
ment, which will likely push the country further in the direction of a market orientation. 
2. Advantages and Disadvantages for Swazi Agricultural Producers 
These developments represent a mixed blessing for African states, such as Swaziland, 
located adjacent to South Africa. On the one hand, they enjoy some of the benefits of a modem 
economy located close by when they engage in trade and technological exchange. Furthermore, 
by being a member of the regional trade group, they receive some protection from lower cost 
foreign producers. Swazi consumers with sufficient purchasing power have become accustomed 
to purchasing high quality South African products in the local markets even though consumer 
prices for many products would likely have been even lower without government intervention 
in South African agriculture. On the other hand, the negative implication for Swazi agricultural 
producers is that they face a South African production system that was built up with the benefit 
of heavy protection and large subsidies. This system now represents formidable competition for 
most products. Small farmers who lack good management skills and who are too small to reap 
the benefits of economies of scale are particularly disadvantaged in attempting to compete with 
the larger South African firms. 
The fact that Swaziland is a price taker relative to a large neighboring market presents 
both advantages and disadvantages to its producers. On the one hand, Swazi farmers have access 
to South African livestock and poultry feeds that are becoming increasingly competitive because 
of policy changes. Prices in Swaziland for yellow com-based poultry feeds, for example, are 
probably less than would prevail if the country tried to become self-sufficient in the production 
of these feeds. Furthermore, technological borrowing in the form of access to new seed 
varieties, fertilizers, improved strains of poultry and livestock, veterinary services, etc. is more 
feasible for Swazi farmers than for farmers in other African countries located more distant from 
modem economies. 
On the other hand, Swazi farmers are constrained to produce products for the domestic 
market that will effectively compete in terms of both price and quality with South African im-
ports. Swaziland is unlike some other African countries where a large domestic demand exists 
for locally produced lower quality products because high transportation costs naturally restrain 
the importation of better quality foreign products. There have also been allegations that Swazi 
producers suffer damages because South Africa dumps surplus products into the Swazi market 
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during periods of oversupply in order to firm up their domestic price levels. Furthermore, Swazi 
farmers must try to produce at low enough costs for export to South Africa so they can still 
make a profit after subtracting their transportation costs from South African wholesale prices. 
This means that Swazi vegetable producers, for example, are forced to be about as efficient as 
their South African counterparts when they try to export during low price, peak South African 
production periods, or they must search for niche markets when prices rise due to low South 
African production. This, of course, is the strategy followed by Swazi farmers who export toma-
toes and cabbages during the South African off season. When they succeed in penetrating these 
niches, the Swazi producers have the advantage of not seriously reducing the seasonally higher 
prices as long as their total exports are small relative to total South African supplies. 
3. Implications for Swazi Producers 
Four important implications for Swazi producers emerge from this analysis. First, the 
technology and inputs appropriate for import substitution production of many products in Swazi-
land are available as close by as South Africa, and they have to be adopted by Swazi producers 
if they hope to be competitive with South African production. Second, strong management and 
organizational skills are crucial for Swazi producers so they can adopt these modern production 
systems. This presents a challenge especially for small farmers with limited managerial and tech-
nical skills. Third, the low cost high quality demands of domestic markets imply that there is 
less opportunity for "learning by doing" in which Swazi producers initially supply lower quality 
domestic markets, then move into increasingly competitive export markets after they have ef-
fectively reduced costs and improved quality. Fourth, Swazi producers need to carefully assess 
possible niche markets in which they are somewhat protected from lower cost foreign producers. 
For the horticultural subsector, these niches may be most logically found during the winter 
season when many South African producing regions are affected by cold temperatures. 
4. Role of the National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) 
The analysis presented above implicitly assumed relatively free trade between South 
Africa and Swaziland. The creation of NAMBOARD with the task of imposing levies and import 
and export quotas in Swaziland represents an attempt by the country to restrict free trade for the 
benefit of producers and consumers. In theory, such trade restrictions would tend to shelter 
Swazi producers from lower cost South African production while assuring consumers of a supply 
of reasonably priced, high quality imported products. 
There are two reasons for which the existence of NAMBOARD was ignored in this 
analysis. First, it is unclear how much any nation will be permitted to legally interfere in free 
trade in the future under the new GATT rules. Second, it is unclear how successful a 
NAMBOARD type of intervention can ever be in a Swaziland situation, especially considering 
horticultural products. The first problem is that food products generally face an inelastic demand 
which means that relatively small changes in supply are translated into relatively large changes 
in price. Second, it is quite difficult to accurately predict future domestic production of many 
fresh fruit and vegetable crops whose yields are highly dependant on variable climatic 
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conditions. Third, the demand for these products has been and will likely continue to be affected 
by irregular patterns of purchases for export to Mozambique. This combination of irregularity 
in supply and demand complicates the technical task of forecasting the correct level of levies and 
quotas required to produce the desired level of trade protection on a product-by-product basis. 
It is not surprising that in practice there would be frequent undershooting and overshooting of 
projections leading to more variable and damaging price patterns than might have occurred 
Without the intervention. 
Therefore, the observed pattern of quite flxed levies over time for all products is 
understandable from an administrative perspective, but this has the effect of converting the levies 
into largely a taxing mechanism rather than a flexible instrument to protect domestic producers. 
The import and export quotas also tend to operate more as a taxing mechanism than as effective 
trade protection. 
ill. The Horticultural Subsector: Participants, Marketing Structure, and Prospects for 
Expansion 
1. Participants in the Subsector 
The major participants in the horticultural subsector include producers, consumers and 
agents providing marketing and support services. On the one hand, there has been fairly free 
trade with South Africa so good quality products are easily imported from South Africa at prices 
below what they can be produced locally. On the other hand, the civil war in Mozambique and 
frost during winter months in South Africa have resulted in some exports from Swaziland. The 
horticultural subsector, therefore, is composed primarily of domestic and intra-regional 
participants. A schematic diagram explaining the flow of commodities through various channels 
in the horticultural subsector is presented in Figure 1. 
The production system of horticultural products is bi-modal consisting of a few large 
commercial farms and several small farms. In general, the participants specialize in only one 
activity such as production, marketing or exporting. Few farms are totally or partially integrated 
to perform both production and marketing functions. The majority of the transactions are 
effected through spot market transactions, and to a lesser extent through market specification 
contractual arrangements. The lack of integrated firms implies that the horticultural sector in 
Swaziland is still in its infancy compared to other major exporting countries. Servicing export 
markets often requires a sophisticated marketing structure with joint ventures and vertically 
integrated production and marketing operations. 
Figure 1. 
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The horticultural products are sourced from several types of producers, small and large, 
both domestic and foreign (see Fig. 1). While domestic producers are generally small farmers 
cultivating Swazi National Lands (SNL), there also exist several large commercial farms 
operating Title Deed Lands (TDL) in peri-urban areas.5 Whereas crops such as cotton, maize 
5 Land in Swaziland is divided into two categories: Swazi National Land (SNL) and Title 
Deed Land (TDL). SNL accounts for 56% of the land area in the country accommodating 80% 
of the population that grows subsistence crops, but contributes only 20.3% to agricultural GDP. 
Ownership of SNL rests with the King who holds it in trust for the nation. There is no security 
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and relatively low value horticultural crops including tomatoes and cabbages are grown on SNL, 
commercial crops including sugarcane, pineapples, cotton and citrus are mainly grown on TDL. 
An important reason for the difference in cropping patterns is due to the fact that the majority 
of the TDL lands are irrigated while SNL lands are usually rainfed. Community gardens, usually 
organized by NGOs for women, produce low value horticultural crops to meet subsistence needs, 
but they are not very common. The majority of the farmers are small individual growers without 
contractual tie ups with large growers or marketing agents. Of late, however, with the initiation 
of the Connnercial Agricultural Production and Marketing (CAPM) project, small farmers are 
beginning to own and operate two packhouses that grade and pack tomatoes, cabbages, green 
peppers, etc., largely for the winter markets in South Africa and the supermarkets in Swaziland. 
In addition, five large white Swazi farmers are contracted by a South African exporter to grow 
minivegetables (baby carrots, baby com, small yellow tomatoes, baby squash, etc.) for European 
markets. This contractual arrangement only assures a market for the products grown and does 
not provide inputs or technical advice to the farmers. 
Swaziland is generally endowed with good soil, weather and irrigation facilities to pro-
duce horticultural products, but total production is not adequate to meet the quantity and quality 
demanded in the domestic markets. Swaziland is self-sufficient only in citrus fruits, except for 
lemons, and tomatoes and cabbages in the winter months. There are limited data on the produc-
tion of horticultural crops other than citrus in Swaziland. About four million cartons of citrus 
fruit are produced annually by seven estates in Swaziland (Citrus Board, 1993). Their activities 
are monitored by the Swaziland Citrus Board. About 60% of the citrus fruits are exported to 
Europe through the South Mrican Citrus Board. While 10% of the other horticultural products 
consumed in the country are produced locally, 90% are imported from South Africa. Tomatoes 
and cabbages are in excess supply in Swaziland during the winter months of June-September and 
NAMBOARD closes the country's borders on these commodities at this time. It is important to 
note that production in South Africa of tomatoes and cabbages is low in these winter months due 
to cold weather and occasional heavy frost. Figures 2 to 5 show that prices in the Pretoria 
wholesale markets are high during these winter months due to limited local production of 
cabbages, butternut squash, green peppers and sweet com. This seasonality pattern offers a 
window of opportunity for Swaziland to export to regional markets in South Africa during the 
winter season. 
of tenure but all Swazis are entitled to an allocation of SNL as a birthright. TDL is held in 
perpetuity and may be inherited, donated, and transacted in land markets. Nearly 45% of the 
land in the country is under TDL. These TDL are usually owned and operated by foreigners. 
Foreigners can own and operate land but the transactions must be approved by the land control 
board. To date, the government has not intervened in any land transaction (Coopers and 
Lybrand, 1993). 
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B. Consumers 
The domestic and intra-regional markets are the primary consumers for the low value 
horticultural products grown in Swaziland. The domestic consumers include supermarkets, 
hotels, restaurants, government institutions, the canning industry, and households (see Fig. 1). 
The major supermarkets including OK, however, obtain 90% of their fresh produce from 
South Africa, while the smaller ones obtain about 50% from Swaziland. Large companies such 
as Vegpack and Prodcure in South Africa regularly supply about 85% of the produce sold in 
large supermarkets such as OK. Some NAMBOARD agents, such as Gastaldis, sell prepacked 
and bar coded produce to the supermarkets. The supermarkets usually pay their suppliers two 
to four weeks after delivery. Several of the large hotels/restaurants also buy the majority of their 
produce from South Africa on an immediate cash payment basis. Nonetheless, medium ho-
tels/restaurants obtain about 60% of their produce on suppliers credit directly from Swazi produ-
cers including NGO gardens and large fanners. Small hotels tend to buy 80-90% of their re-
quirements from local Swazi traders for cash on a first -come first -served basis. Swazican, the 
canning company, purchases citrus only from Swaziland but imports other fruits from South 
Africa. Government institutions are usually supplied by large Swazi fanners and catering 
companies. 
Products such as citrus and minivegetables are exported to European markets through 
South Africa. However, low value crops such as tomatoes, cabbages, carrots, lettuce and avoca-
does are exported to Mozambique and South Africa. Our interviews in the Pretoria and Durban 
markets indicate that there is a large demand for fresh fruits and vegetables in South Africa. For 
example, it is estimated that about 500 tons/month of tomatoes are consumed in Durban. While 
South African producers have the capacity to produce the majority of the products consumed, 
there is an opportunity for Swazi exports to South Africa during the winter months. 6 The Swazis 
sell through agents in the South African fresh produce markets and/or private wholesale agents 
including Indian traders. 
6 The Indian traders interviewed in Durban indicated that the 'Nema' variety of tomatoes 
is consumed by the local Indian ethnic community due only to its low price and high shelf-life. 
In general, however, the Indians prefer 'Roma' and round tomatoes. Indeed, the demand for 
'Nema' has been estimated at 60 tons/month (about only 12% of the total demand for tomatoes). 
11 
FIGURE 2. CABBAGE PRICES • PRETORIA WHOLESALE MARKET 
a o.s-+-----------t----\------------j 
~ 
0 
z 
~0.25-+-----------1----+-----------j 
~ 
~ 
fS ~ 0.2--l----1-----~IIF---------\-----------j 
(I) 
C) 
e 
~ 
< 0.15-+---1--------------\----------j 
0.1-+---r--,----,------,--,.---r---;----,---.---,----i"' 
JUNE AUG 
JAN MAY JULY SEPT NOV 
Months from January 
FIGURE 3. GREEN PEPPER PRICES • PRETORIA WHOLESALE MARKET 
3 
2.8 
§12.6 
0 z2.4 
~2.2 
~ 
s 2 Q. 
-i 1.8 
& 
; 1.6 
" <1.4 
1.2 
.I 
v 
FEB 
JAN 
-I 
I 
MARCH 
Average 1991-1992 
1\ 
l_\ 
-
l ~ 
/\I \ 
I \i \ 
___.__I \ 
-
.. ~ 
\ 
\ 
AP1RIL I JUNE I AUG I OCT I DE c 
MAY JULY SEPT NOV 
Months from January 
Source: Mark Wood, Consultant. Original source was the Pretoria Market Statistics. 
12 
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C. Marketing agents 
Marketing agents including wholesalers, retailers and commission agents function in seve-
ral municipal markets and in the Swaziland Fresh Produce Market (SFPM) to facilitate the 
smooth flow of commodities from several sources to local wholesale and retail consumers. 6 In 
general, the marketing functions are carried out by specialized marketing agents rather than by 
the producers themselves. 
The domestic consumers are serviced by several retailers, wholesalers and hawkers who 
function within municipal markets, fresh produce markets, supermarkets, green grocers and open 
air markets. These traders purchase from both Swazi and South African producers. While some 
traders purchase directly from producers, others buy from the fresh produce markets located in 
the two countries. There are also some South African wholesalers who bring produce into 
Swaziland and sell it off trucks in the parking lots of the major municipal markets. The majority 
of the transactions at both the wholesale and retail levels are conducted on an immediate cash 
payment basis. Supplier's credit is limited to very short periods to only a few long tenn 
customers of wholesalers and retailers. 
Exports to intra-regional markets in Mozambique and South Africa are conducted through 
several wholesalers who regularly visit the SFPM to buy from the four commission agents 
operating on the market floor. These commission agents buy their products from local producers 
and from South Africa. Also, several individual traders, primarily Indians from South Africa, 
directly purchase low value products for cash from Swazi producers for export. This is especial-
ly significant for tomatoes and cabbages during the winter months of June-September. Several 
Swazi producers also consign their produce either directly or through Swazi traders to the 
wholesale markets in South Africa (see Figs. 1 and 6). 
The exportation of fresh citrus products to Europe is done through the Swazi Citrus 
Board, an affiliate of the South African Citrus Board, while citrus concentrates are exported 
through the canning company, Swazican. The exports of minivegetables to Europe, which is a 
recent activity, is done primarily through a South African commission agent (see Fig. 6). Five 
white Swazis function as outgrowers for this South African exporter who provides them with an 
assured market and information about product specifications demanded in the European markets. 
The producers, in tum, contract with a local consulting firm to acquire the technical assistance 
necessary to grow minivegetables to suit European market specifications. The producers usually 
consign their products to the agent. Although this is a promising marketing opportunity to be 
explored, it is highly competitive and the records of one producer suggested that the initial pro-
fits have been modest. 
6 Our interviews indicated that while there are differences in direct access to some 
marketing agents, there is little variation in the marketing agents used by TDL and SNL farmers. 
Figure 6. 
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Flow of Produce and Finance for Swazi Horticultural Produce in Regional 
and Overseas Markets. 
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Support Service Agents and Support Services 
a. NAMBOARD 
The National Agricultural Marketing Board (NAMBOARD) was established in 1986 to 
provide Swazi fanners with improved marketing facilities to achieve food self-sufficiency. 
NAMBOARD registers wholesale distributors, importers and exporters, and facilitates the 
storage, distribution and sale of selected agricultural products including fresh fruits, fresh 
vegetables and poultry. The Board, however, is not very efficient in tracking exports from and 
imports into Swaziland, and this is reflected in the limited infonnation available on exports and 
imports. Although NAMBOARD functions as a major tax collection mechanism, the collection 
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of levies on imports is usually based on undervalued declarations made by the importers to the 
customs department. 
Since 1987, NAMBOARD has also operated the Swaziland Fresh Produce Market 
(SFPM) which provides a market place for buyers and sellers of fresh fruits and vegetables. 8 
The market agents (currently four) are appointed by the Board to conduct the trading. They 
follow a dual trading system: they buy and sell products obtained at the farm gate from farmers, 
and they buy from farmers who deliver their produce to SFPM for sale on consignment. The 
agents obtain products from both Swazi and South African producers. Indeed, some 
NAMBOARD agents are directly buying produce from CAPM farmers. The marketing agents 
charge a commission of 5 to 7.5% depending on product perishability. The SFPM collects a 
market fee of 5 % on the value of all produce sold on the floor to cover its administrative and 
operational costs. SFPM operates cold storage rooms of 510m3 in total size, a banana ripening 
facility for 60 tons per week, and a small packhouse facility. 9 These facilities are available for 
lease by private entrepreneurs. Several Mozambican traders frequent the market to purchase 
products for sale in Maputo. 
Some small farmers regard SFPM as a useful institution, but the consignment system of 
marketing has been criticized by many. While the NAMBOARD agents pay cash to South 
African producers, they insist on a consignment 'sale or return' method for Swazi producers. 
The consignment payment system shifts all market risks to the producers, causes delays and 
complicates the payment procedure. Several of the Swazi producers, therefore, prefer selling to 
Indian and Swazi traders instead of to NAMBOARD agents. 10 However, the system does 
provide a market of last resort for farmers' produce which cannot be sold for cash elsewhere. 
When market prices fluctuate, the system may give higher prices over the contracted set price. 
Although the total horticultural production in Swaziland was estimated at 5. 2 thousand metric 
tons, only 1.2 tons were traded through SFPM in 1992. 
8 SFPM was officially renamed by the King in October 1994 as the "Ncebeni Produce 
Market." 
9 SFPM now operates a farm input supply store, and a seedling nursery. They are trying 
to be more multipurpose. Indeed, talks are underway with the Egyptian government to establish 
a vegetable cannery unit. 
10 It was reported in 1988 that about 150-200 small scale Swazi private traders functioned 
as major market outlets for Swazi producers. The survey estimates that these private traders 
purchased 86% of the local produce directly from the farms by paying cash (Food Studies 
Group, Oxford, 1994). 
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The total volume traded through SFPM is fairly large. Of the total of 27.1 thousand tons 
of products traded in Swaziland, SFPM accounted for 13.7 thousand metric tons. 11 Of this 
total, approximately 0.6 thousand metric tons were reported to be exported to Mozambique and 
South Africa (NAMBOARD, 1992). Although many farmers prefer flxed pricing over 
consignment sales, the volume of trading by Swazi farmers has increased from 1.2 thousand 
metric tons in 1992 to 2.3 thousand metric tons in 1993. Total SFPM throughput increased from 
13.7 to 15.9 thousand metric tons from 1992 to 1993 (SFPM, 1994). 
SFPM does not insist on any quality I grading requirements for products traded on its 
floor. This reduces the incentives for producers to bring good quality products to the market. 
The cold storage facility is not augmented by humidifiers/chillers to prolong the storage life of 
the products. Since the market handles a small amount of local production, it depends heavily 
on South African imports to achieve a critical mass to break-even. For example, of the total 
throughput in 1993, only 14.5% came from Swazi producers; the rest was imported from South 
Africa. The question of incentives for routing local production through SFPM needs to be 
addressed if it is to achieve sustainability in the long run. 
Although SFPM resembles the South African National Fresh Produce Markets found in 
South Africa, there is considerable room for improvements. These improvements are especially 
important if SFPM decides to continue the consignment method of sales. For example, the 
efficient payment system followed in Pretoria and Durban Fresh Produce Markets could be 
replicated in SFPM. Such a system has been considered at SFPM, but currently there are no 
funds to procure the equipment and hire a computer specialist to operate the system. 
b. CAPM Project12 
The CAPM project was designed by USAID in 1991 to stimulate small farm commercial 
horticultural producers by identifying private marketing firms that could vertically integrate their 
operations to provide farmers with technical services and reliable marketing outlets. A mismatch 
in the interests between the private firms and the small farmers, insufficient existing business 
links that Swazi firms had with South African wholesalers, lack of programmed production, 
drought, and a lack of marketing firms capable of integrating their operations led to the failure 
of this approach. In 1993, following an in-depth study, the project strategy shifted from 
developing vertically integrated marketing firms to the development of the marketing capabilities 
of farmer organizations. The modified objectives now include: (i) developing farmer 
organizations that are able to assist small farmers in producing and assembling quality fresh 
11 A total of 21.9 thousand metric tons of fresh fruits and vegetables were imported in 1992, 
while the total production of horticultural products in Swaziland was estimated at only 5.2 
thousand metric tons. 
12 This section is based on USAID reports about the CAPM and our interviews with CAPM 
officials and farmers. 
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produce and linking them to markets, (ii) training fanners to produce quality crops to meet 
market demand, and to a lesser extent (iii) assisting in developing agribusinesses that provide 
services to small farm horticultural production and marketing. 
Currently, the project targets small farmers, farmers organizations and marketing firms. 
The project assists farmers in three regions with assured irrigation: Northern Rural Development 
Area (NRDA), Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF) and Siphofanene/Sitobela. Furthermore, it assists 
the central region in developing drip irrigation and identifying market outlets. The project 
farmers are required: (i) to have access to irrigated land, (ii) to be willing to grow targeted 
crops, and (iii) to be located close to targeted regional farmers organizations. 13 By the end of 
the project, CAPM will have provided approximately 230 farmers and 10 organization leaders 
per area with intensive training in the production and marketing of horticultural crops on a 
commercial basis. The majority of the CAPM farmers are SNL farmers. By the end of 1993, 
there were 138 farmers registered with CAPM (30% being women)Y CAPM farmers account 
for about 57% of the total farmers in the areas where the project operates. However, not all land 
operated by CAPM farmers is devoted to growing CAPM crops. It was estimated that SNL 
farmers used 44% of their land for CAPM crops, while TDL farmers used only about 7%. 
Training, technical assistance, business advice, a guarantee for loans made by the 
Swaziland Development and Savings Bank (SDSB) and assistance in sourcing production inputs 
are provided to farmers organizations to achieve the project objectives. The project experts also 
investigate and attempt to develop reliable marketing links in domestic and regional markets in 
close coordination with the farmers organizations. For example, in 1993, the project initially 
assisted about 77 small farmers spread out in a radius of about 30-40 km. by setting up a farmer 
operated packhouse facility in one region. 15 This and the second packhouse established in 1994 
are used to grade and pack tomatoes, green peppers, cabbages and carrots for the supermarkets 
and SFPM. The project arranged for the transportation of prepacked products from the 
packhouse to the SFPM, and negotiated with market agents so products can be sold to 
supermarkets and South African traders. The project also arranged for input supplies, offered 
13 Green beans, green peppers, tomatoes, sweet com, cabbages are targeted by CAPM. 
About 1,500 hectares representing 2.6% of the total land currently under irrigation in Swaziland 
have the potential to be included under the project. The majority of the irrigation systems were 
developed by several donors including IF AD and Republic of China. 
14 This includes 100 farmers covering 57 hectares in NRDA, 25 farmers cropping 37 
hectares in Siphofanene/Sithobela and 13 farmers on 6 hectares in VIF. 
15 Many of the CAPM farmers continued their long-standing business relationships with 
Indian traders from South Africa and with Swazi traders. These traders purchased the products 
by paying cash immediately at the farmgate. CAPM is working on the dilemma of more less ad 
hoc. farmer sales to vendors versus more systematic sales through packhouses. 
18 
technical advice and linked several farmer groups to the SDSB. 16 Furthermore, a grant was 
provided by USAID to SBGT to develop an agribusiness advisory service that will assist in 
agricultural supply and service companies and potentially larger CAPM members. 
The project can be commended for recognizing the difficult issues involved in the 
successful production and marketing of horticultural products. However, implementation has 
been difficult in the Swazi situation which is dominated by small farmers, the planned project 
beneficiaries. Therefore, the CAPM project has had mixed results. The challenge for the project 
lies in effectively encouraging and training farmers organizations to become efficient production 
and marketing agents and continue on a sustainable basis after the project ends in 1995. 
Mechanisms should be developed so that large farmers and private entrepreneurs can be incor-
porated into the program for efficient production and marketing of horticultural crops on a 
commercial basis. Markets for horticultural products can be created only when an economically 
viable crop production occurs on a consistent basis. The critical mass required to be economi-
cally viable can only be achieved through increased production. It is important to develop 
incentive compatible contractual arrangements so that private entrepreneurs will undertake some 
of the project functions in stimulating production. The entrepreneurs could be pure traders who 
assist small farmers to secure a market and provide them with technical assistance, or they could 
be large growers who contract with several small farmers to produce for a specific market. The 
project should aim at effectively servicing the regional markets before exploring European 
markets. Import substitution or export promotion activities need to be carried out on an 
economically viable basis and not on national self-sufficiency objectives. 
c. Support services: Infrastructure and transport facilities 
Total investments in public infrastructure in 1993 represented only 7.1% of the GDP 
(SDSB, 1993). Government research and extension support for the production of horticultural 
products is limited. MOAC has a small horticultural research section. Extension has six regional 
agents working solely with horticulture while other extension agents are generalists. Research 
and extension agents face problems of limited resources including transportation. 
Although paved roads connect major market places, most internal transportation facilities 
are poor. There are occasions during the rainy months when farmers in the interior can not bring 
their produce to market due to washed out roads. Since Swaziland is landlocked, the majority 
of the produce exported to Europe needs to be airfreighted. However, the facilities available at 
16 Lack of access to credit was not reported by CAPM farmers to be a serious constraint 
compared to problems in marketing and lack of technical advice for production. Indeed, the 
perceived high risk associated with the production and marketing process was observed to inhibit 
the use of external financing more than the lack of credit supply sources (Gardner and Bielen, 
1990). Indeed, CAPM farmers were glad that the project did not require them to take inputs 
on credit. There was a need, however, for consultation between CAPM farmers and the CAPM 
officials who prepared the cash flow statements for farmers applying to SDSB. 
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the airport do not service large cargo aircraft. On the other hand, a large fleet of trucks and an 
improving railway are used to transport the majority of products sold to South Africa and 
Mozambique. In addition, there are companies that produce good quality packaging materials 
used in transporting perishable products. Furthermore, through the USAID funded CAPM 
project, two vegetable packhouses are being operated by small farmers who grade and prepack 
their products for sale to supermarkets, SFPM and South African traders. The lack of critical 
mass, however, constrains the development of massive infrastructure facilities on an 
economically feasible basis. The role of finance in supporting the horticultural sector will be 
discussed later. 
2. Prospects For Expanding and Improving the Subsector 
Swaziland has several advantages that facilitate the expansion and diversification of 
production and the substitution of imports for certain horticultural products. But it is challenged 
by several constraints. 
A. Advantages 
a. Business environment 
The Government has implemented liberal macroeconomic policies that provide some 
stability to the economy. Memberships in the Common Monetary Area (CMA) with South 
Africa, Namibia and Lesotho, and in the South African Customs Union (SACU) with South 
Africa, Lesotho and Botswana allow for the free flow of trade among these countries with a 
common currency. Exchange controls up to 15% of foreign exchange earnings apply only to the 
transfer of funds between Swaziland and areas outside the CMA. The government also provides 
investors with liberal tax holidays of up to five years from the time of establishment of the 
business. Few restrictions exist on the transfer of investment funds into Swaziland or on the 
ownership of land by foreign nationals. Although special licenses are required for foreigners to 
engage in agricultural activities, no restrictions exist on local equity investments or direct 
partnerships by Swazi nationals. A good formal banking system exists to transfer funds around 
the world and facilitate smooth financial transactions. 
b. Climatic conditions 
The sub-tropical, largely frost free climate enables the year round production of several 
sub-tropical fruits and vegetables. This climatic advantage is especially important during the 
winter months when South Africa and Lesotho are affected by frost and snow. 
c. Availability of technology and skills 
Although Swaziland does not have adequate skilled technicians and consultants, they are 
readily available from South Africa, and to a lesser extent in the University of Swaziland. 
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Private consulting firms are beginning to appear in Swaziland to provide technical assistance to 
the sub sector. 
d. Infrastructure 
Although the infrastructure required for the efficient functioning of the subsector is 
relatively poor in terms of communication and transport facilities, good roads and a small 
railway system connect major marketing centers. Municipal markets are well organized and 
SFPM provides a market place, and public cold storage, ripening and packing facilities. A 
limited amount of matchmaking between market agents and producers/ sellers is also carried out 
by the SFPM. In addition, good packaging materials are locally available for use in packing 
products for municipal markets, supermarkets and exports. 
e. Market 
A market for fresh fruits and vegetables exists, especially for prepacked good quality pro-
ducts in both Swaziland and neighboring countries. Swazi consumers, unlike consumers in many 
other Sub-Saharan African countries, demand and pay premium prices for good quality products. 
Furthermore, production inputs are readily available in local markets or from South Africa. 
B. Constraints 
The current marketing structure can substitute for imports and serve domestic markets 
and, to a lesser extent, neighboring African countries. Nonetheless, Swaziland must make major 
improvements if it is to better service domestic markets, and tap the potential that exists in intra-
regional and European markets. Several factors limit its ability to effectively service these 
markets. 
a. Competition 
Swaziland faces strong competition from South Africa in its effort to penetrate the 
domestic and intra-regional fresh fruit and vegetable markets. Swazi consumers are relatively 
accustomed to a reliable supply of fairly inexpensive but good quality products from South 
Africa. It has been difficult for most Swazi producers to meet these quality requirements at 
competitive prices, given high production costs and several constraints. 
b. Lack of infrastructure and irrigation facilities 
The lack of good feeder roads that connect interior villages to major marketing centers 
represent the most important infrastructure constraint. Furthermore, irrigation schemes are 
concentrated in only a few regions. The majority of the fanners are, therefore, constrained by 
the lack of adequate water to sustain commercial horticultural production. 
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c. Thin financial markets 
Formal financial services are accessible only to large farmers. While the SDSB provides 
subsidized loans to small farmers using group lending techniques, the program is driven by 
donor funds and lacks sustainability. Informal finance is not very well developed either. Forward 
contracts and outgrower contracts are infrequent. 
d. Poor market information 
Although SFPM and CAPM provide information on market prices, the availability of 
information about alternate market outlets, products and varieties for new markets, new 
technology, etc., is limited. 
C. Prospects for expansion 
Given the advantages and constraints faced by the subsector, significant and sustainable 
expansion of small farmer commercial horticultural production and marketing will require seri-
ous cooperative efforts on the part of the public and private sector to overcome the constraints. 
This section examines few options for expanding the horticultural subsector in Swaziland. 
a. Diversification 
The Swaziland Government has encouraged policies to diversify the agricultural sector 
since 1987. The formation of SIDC in 1987, Swazican and Coca Cola Concentrates were results 
of these efforts. There is room for diversification, but it is limited by several constraints 
including the lack of skilled personnel, a small domestic market, and difficulties in obtaining 
fruits and vegetables from Swaziland on a consistent basis. 
i. Canning industry 
Swazican is a major canning company and is currently owned largely by Swazi nationals. 
It processes pineapples, grapefruit, oranges, peaches and apricots into fruit juice concentrates, 
jams and fruit segments/slices. The company actually purchases about 8,000 tons of grapefruit 
and 5,000 tons of oranges from several small farmers in Swaziland, and buys occasionally from 
South Africa and Mozambique to overcome shortfalls. Recently, the company began 
experimenting with market specification contracts to purchase guavas and melons from domestic 
small farmers for the preparation of jams and jellies. These contracts generally provide 
producers with a promise of an assured market but no production inputs or technical assistance. 
However, the management revealed that there have been difficulties in obtaining regular supplies 
from Swazi farmers. In addition, farmers tend to deliver for processing rejects from other 
markets. They are paid in cash immediately on delivery of the products. The company grows 
about 50,000 tons of pineapples on its own land, and contracts production with 30 large domestic 
pineapple growers. Peaches and apricots are imported from South Africa. While jams are 
exported to South Africa, fruit juice concentrates and segments are exported to Europe. 
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Wholesalers in the Durban market reported that the prices of Swazican products are higher than 
the canned products imported from Thailand. Swazican products are sold under several major 
food company labels in Europe, including Libby's in the UK. 
The potential exists to expand the canning industry since the facility is currently 
underutilized due to an irregular supply of products for processing. Increasing production would 
expand employment, reduce the prices of finished products due to economies of scale, and earn 
foreign exchange for the country. However, the problem of inconsistent supply of inexpensive 
good quality .raw materials needs to be solved. Contractual arrangements with farmers must 
provide adequate incentives for them to consistently deliver good products. A more fundamental 
problem, however, concerns the cost of production. Furthermore, the equipment used is highly 
specific to processing citrus and pineapple fruits. This hinders diversification into making 
alternative products such as tomato ketchup and sauces. 
ii. Pickling industry 
Currently, a local firm, Eswatini Swazi Kitchen, is engaged in preserving fruits and 
vegetables. Also Bromor Foods (SWD) prepares squash and jelly powder from locally grown 
citrus. However, the unavailability of raw materials on a consistent basis from Swaziland was 
reported as being a major problem. In addition, a local NGO is encouraging women to pickle 
vegetables in the winter season for use in the summer months. 
b. Role for small farmers 
The numerous small farmers in the country need to be better integrated into a full scale 
production and marketing system if they are to expand their production of horticultural products 
and reduce import dependency. The CAPM project currently helps small farmers to prepack 
their produce in farmer operated packhouses, arranges for the transportation of prepacked 
products from the packhouses to the SFPM, and negotiates with market agents so products can 
be sold to supermarkets and South African traders. These efforts have had mixed results due to 
a variety of problems discussed earlier. Some method must be found through contractual 
arrangements so that private entrepreneurs will undertake some of the these functions. The 
entrepreneurs could be pure traders who assist the small farmers to secure a market and provide 
them with technical assistance, or they could be large growers who contract with several small 
farmers to produce for a specific market. 
One white Swazi exporter is conducting an experiment by contracting some 15 small 
farmers to grow chillies for the Indian ethnic market in South Africa. He provides them with 
inputs, technical assistance and an assured market. While the use of contract farming is limited 
by the nature of the products grown and the type of markets served due to problems in quality 
control, it nonetheless offers a way to integrate small farmers into the commercial horticultural 
production system. A strong contractual relationship between small and large farmers will also 
enable small farmers to diversify into growing high value crops such as strawberries, 
minivegetables, chillies, herbs and asparagus for exports in future. In the mean time, small 
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farmers in Swaziland should concentrate on growing tomatoes and cabbages of sufficient quality 
and quantity to meet the demands of lower income domestic consumers and Indian markets in 
South Africa. The Indian market in South Africa does not demand high quality products. Some 
of the more advanced farmers producing better quality products can produce for higher income 
local and regional markets. 
c. Role for large farmers 
Large farmers are generally able to obtain inputs, credit and technical assistance to 
produce good quality products. Efforts are needed to encourage them to use contract farming 
to increase their marketable surplus, and thereby achieve the critical mass needed to serve 
specific markets including domestic, intra-regional and European markets. This system would 
also help small farmers who generally lack access to technical assistance and to markets. In 
addition, partially integrated farms using outgrower contracts and joint ventures with traders and 
processing industries may be viable options. Successful experiments of this type would increase 
the probability that the country would eventually succeed in serving European markets in future. 
IV. The Poultry Subsector 
The poultry subsector is somewhat similar to the horticultural subsector in that it has a 
bimodal production structure. There are a few large broiler and layer operations, usually owned 
or operated by whites, employing modern technology imported from South Africa, with opera-
tional costs low enough to compete with South African producers in filling niche markets in 
Swaziland. There are also a large number of smaller producers, mainly supplying household 
needs or local markets. Like the horticultural sector, domestic production represents only a frac-
tion of total consumption, especially for high quality eggs and broilers, so there is scope for im-
port substitution production. However, unlike horticulture, there are no strong seasonal patterns 
in the production of poultry products so Swaziland has no clear seasonal advantage relative to 
South Africa. Furthermore, there are suggestions that even modern South African producers 
have difficulty in competing in international markets so this seems to clearly rule out Swazi ex-
ports of poultry products for the foreseeable future. Figure 7 presents the major channels 
through which poultry products flow from producers to consumers. Unlike horticultural pro-
ducts, there are no wholesale markets through which the products flow and where prices are de-
termined. 
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Figure 7. Flow of Products in Swaziland Poultry Sub sector. 
r----------------------------, r---------------- ---------------, I 
I I 
Final Consumers 
Notes: Point of Lay/day old chicks and feed; L: Layers; B: Broilers. 
1. Major participants in the subsector 
A. Producers 
There are two major broiler producers in the country. One is Valley Farms which 
currently produces about 15,000 broilers per week. It is highly vertically integrated. In addition 
to broilers, it has a hatchery to produce its own day old chicks, a slaughter plant to process its 
own production and some broilers of another producer, and the feed retailing fmn, Tri-Cash. 
Tri-Cash is the exclusive Swaziland distributor for the NLK company of South Africa. It handles 
a wide variety of poultry and livestock feeds. The second large producer is Swazi Chick which 
currently produces about 20,000 broilers per week and is developing an expansion plan to double 
operations, operate an outgrower scheme, and construct a slaughter plant to process the total 
production. Swazi Chick is linked to Swazi Feed, a feed mixing plant taken over from the 
governmeD;t two years ago. It produces feed using corn imported from South Africa mixed with 
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byproducts purchased from local industries. This flnn imports all of its day old chicks from 
South Africa. Both flrms sell some of their broilers processed and some live. There are also a 
number of smaller producers that import all their day old chicks and sell live broilers. Finally, 
there are a large number of fanners that each produce a small number of broilers for home 
consumption and local sales. 
Egg producers are somewhat more heterogeneous. A prison farm with 12,000 layers is 
one of the largest producers. It is reported to be well run and produces exclusively for its captive 
market. One producer has had 8,000 layers in production since December. He sells directly to 
supermarkets under the label Farmers Free Range Eggs to identify that his layers are not caged. 
His eggs have a strong demand in the marketplace because they are believed to be fresher than 
imports. It is reported that there are about seven egg producer cooperatives. Two cooperatives 
have received assistance from a U.S./Israeli development project. Both have central production 
facilities and several individual members as outgrowers, each with their flocks of one to several 
hundred hens. The Khutsala cooperative was started in 1988 and currently has a total of about 
25,000 layers. The Shibani cooperative was just started in 1993 and has 2,000 layers in its 
central facility. This cooperative has 27 members each with some 100 hens per member. The 
coops and their members sell their eggs through a variety of methods including sales to 
wholesalers, and direct sales to consumers, small retailers, and supermarkets. Finally, many 
farmers have a few hens raised in traditional free range systems that produce for home 
consumption and local sales. 
B. Input suppliers 
Except for Valley Farms, broiler producers purchase their day old chicks from South 
Africa, especially since the government hatchery closed production. All point of lay pullets are 
imported for laying operations. Two supply problems exist for Swazi producers. First, there is 
often sharp competition for available supplies. Purchases are usually scheduled in advance so 
hatchery and point of lay producers incorporate the advance orders into their production systems. 
Second, poultry diseases have been a problem in both South Africa and Swaziland, and Swazi 
producers have not always received good quality birds. For example, one producer had to cull 
500 point of lay pullets out of 4,000 purchased because of their poor quality. 
With the exception of Swazi Feed, all commercially blended poultry feed is imported 
from South Africa. Feed milling is constrained by the lack of yellow com production in Swazi-
land. TriCash may be responsible for as much as 70 to 80 percent of all the livestock feed sold 
in the country. There are important economies of scale in feed purchasing. Purchasers of large 
quantities can get price discounts of as much as 2 percent by buying in bulk rather than in bag, 
and may get suppliers credit for 30 days or more. Furthermore, purchasers of truck load lots 
can reduce handling and transportation costs by arranging direct delivery to their farmsteads. 
Their total cost is the discounted retail price plus the marginal transportation costs from the 
retailer's site to the farmstead. 
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The medium to large scale producers may be able to reduce feed costs by producing 
and/or buying yellow com and grinding it in small, on-farm mills. There is, however, little 
production experience in Swaziland because white com is produced for human consumption. 
Pricing relationships also impede local production. The support price for white com is over 
E600 per ton while the cost of imported com is about E550 per ton plus a 3 percent levy. Unless 
there are productivity advantages in producing yellow rather than white com, producers will 
logically produce white com, and import and grind yellow com if they think it will reduce costs 
relative to importing complete rations. 
Laying cages, feeders, pumps and watering equipment, veterinary supplies, and some 
construction materials for both broiler and laying operations are imported directly by producers 
or local retailers. Larger producers enjoy advantages because they can undertake the search costs 
of comparative shopping for the best prices, qualities and technologies in South Africa. 
C. Marketing systems 
The marketing systems employed vary by volume and quality of products sold. Larger 
broiler and egg producers can obtain better prices and profit margins by selling directly to 
consumers, supennarkets, hotels, and restaurants. However, they also incur the cost of 
developing these marketing arrangements, delivering the products, and waiting for payment. 
Producers of broilers and spent laying hens have the option of selling live or processed birds 
directly to fmal consumers, to wholesalers or to small retailers and hawkers. Eggs and processed 
broilers can only be stored for a few weeks so there are advantages for producers to arrange for 
orderly and speedy marketing. Prices tend to fluctuate in response to changes in prices of 
imported products. Swazi producers have to cut prices in order to move products during periods 
of South African oversupply and soft prices. 
An important mechanism in the linkage of South African with Swazi prices occurs 
through the firm Family Fun, a major wholesaler of frozen poultry and eggs. It sells to 
supermarkets, restaurants, hotels, and caterers. About 85 percent of its total sales of these 
products are imported from three or four major South African suppliers. The large Swazi poultry 
producers sell directly to supermarkets when they can, but sell at wholesale prices to Family Fun 
when demand is low. Likewise, supermarkets compare the prices of local producers with Family 
Fun imports when making their purchases. The producers also decide whether or not to incur 
the costs of slaughtering by comparing the prevailing prices for live and processed poultry. Live 
birds are sold to specialized retailers, who sell to consumers and hawkers, and occasionally 
directly to consumers and hawkers. Price competition also occurs when local supermarket 
managers determine whether or not to purchase locally or directly from the South African 
wholesalers that regularly supply their supermarket chain. 
D. Retailers 
The primary retailers are large supermarkets, small retail shops, including specialized 
outlets for live poultry, and hawkers. Supermarkets are large and modem. They have access to 
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South African wholesalers/suppliers that supply the entire supermarket chain with a line of pro-
ducts. With this system, many products are delivered to the supermarkets prepackaged, marked 
and priced. 17 If the local manager wants to reduce his workload in buying from several dif-
ferent suppliers, he can simply order from the chain's procurement system. Supermarkets that 
operate on a franchise basis, such as Spar, have more flexibility in procurement. The perception 
exists that they are more willing to buy from local producers. Several of the large producers 
attempt to integrate their operations and increase their profit margins by supplying supermarkets 
directly. 
There is a strong market for live chickens by African consumers, frequently without 
home refrigeration, who prefer larger birds than typically produced in broiler operations, and 
who prefer to slaughter just prior to consumption. Small specialized retailers and hawkers serve 
this live poultry market and also sell eggs. These retailers buy directly from producers and from 
wholesalers. In rural areas, consumers frequently buy live poultry and eggs directly from 
producers. 
2. Support Services 
Poultry producers do not obtain much support from the government. There is little 
poultry research in the country. The government has a few poultry extension agents who appear 
to be constrained by a lack of access to modem technology, and vehicles and other resources 
to conduct extension programs. Fanners considering making investments in the sector get 
information from other producers, private consultants and South Africa. The government owned 
hatchery that produced day old chicks has been idle since last September due to a disease 
outbreak which required complete liquidation of the flock. A handful of donor projects work 
with fanners to stimulate poultry production. An important constraint in the country is the lack 
of a poultry veterinarian. Several of the large producers have an advantage by banding together 
to share the cost of periodically hiring in a South African veterinarian for consultations. 
3. Challenges for Expanding and Improving the Subsector 
Swaziland has some opportunities to expand the poultry subsector, but it also faces 
important constraints due to the general characteristics of poultry enterprises and the specific 
problems the country faces. The nature of the general business environment was reported above 
in the horticultural sector. This section summarizes other issues specific to poultry. 
17 Purchasing imports does not always guarantee good, uniform products. A considerable 
variation has been noted in egg sizes within individual cartons. 
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A. Advantages 
a. Market 
An important advantage exists for poultry compared to some other subsectors within agri-
culture: a market is readily available because the country imports a large share of the poultry 
products consumed. 
b. Availability of technology and infrastructure 
The technology of producing and processing poultry products is well developed and is 
readily available next door in South Africa. It can be imported and adopted with little adaptation 
in Swaziland provided the necessary inputs can be obtained. As noted above, communication and 
transport facilities need improvements, but the country has a fairly good road system which is 
needed to import production inputs and transport broilers and eggs. 
c. Resources 
Swaziland has underutilized land that can be allocated to poultry production. An 
important resource is labor, especially on small farms with a low opportunity cost of time and 
where a source of cash income is highly desired by low income people. An hour or so per day 
of time spent in caring for a hundred laying hens, for example, is quite feasible on many farms. 
The development and operation of cooperatives which require the input of member labor is 
somewhat more complicated because of transportation limitations for the members. 
d. Disease Control 
Since Swaziland does not have much poultry production now, it may have an advantage 
in ease of controlling the potential spread of poultry diseases compared to South Africa which 
has a heavier concentration of large scale producers. 
B. Constraints 
If Swaziland is going to successfully expand the poultry subsector, it must efficiently 
produce good quality products that are competitive with South Africa. The constraints to 
expanded production include the following: 
a. Regular supply of inexpensive inputs and support services 
A serious constraint is that Swazi producers do not have a domestic supply of inexpensive 
production inputs or support services. For example, the efficient production of day old chicks 
and point of lay pullets is one of the most technically demanding aspects of the entire production 
system. The disease problems of the government hatchery demonstrate one aspect of the 
problem. Therefore, for the foreseeable future, Swaziland will have to depend on South Africa 
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and pay the higher prices implied in importing most of its chicks and pullets. A second 
constraint is the supply of yellow com. For the reasons noted above, that situation is unlikely 
to change due to price differences between the prices paid for domestic white com and imported 
South African yellow com. Thirdly, several other inputs used in large quantities, such as egg 
cartons, are expensive if purchased locally. Fourth, there is little domestic research or extension 
capacity for poultry, and there is no poultry veterinarian in the country. 
b. The characteristics of the enterprises 
The characteristics of the poultry enterprises relative to some other farm enterprises 
constrain their adoption by many farmers, especially small farmers, for several reasons. First, 
poultry enterprises are by definition fairly capital intensive and there is a considerable degree 
of asset fixity; that is there are relatively few alternative uses for specialized poultry buildings 
and equipment if a producer wants to terminate production. These assets are saleable only to 
other poultry producers. Second, a good water supply and supplemental lighting are required to 
ensure maximum disease free production. Third, there is always the risk of devastating disease 
outbreaks as occurred recently in South Africa. Strict disease prevention techniques and a regular 
vaccination program are essential features of good management. For these reasons, lenders are 
reluctant to make poultry loans, especially if the farmer has had little previous experience in 
producing poultry. 
c. Complex management 
Egg and broiler technology is well developed, but it is complex and easy to mismanage. 
Profit margins are thin. For example, one large producer reported that if broilers are held just 
three days beyond their optimum slaughter date, the profits are eliminated. Eggs and frozen 
chicken cannot be stored for long periods in order to avoid selling when prices are low so a 
premium is earned by those producers who can organize sales to ensure a reasonable price at 
all times. To even out cash inflows and outflows, the larger producers use several buildings each 
with birds at a different phase in their production cycle. Financial mismanagement is always a 
threat for producers who operate as joint ventures or as cooperatives, and good management 
skills are frequently reported to be a serious constraint in the country. 
d. Competition from South Africa 
An oversupply problem reportedly exists for poultry products in South Africa and is 
expected to continue in the future. This will tend to keep import prices low which will put 
pressure on producer prices in Swaziland. Under these conditions, there will be temptations to 
dump some of the oversupply into the Swazi market, as has reportedly occurred in the past. 
Swaziland may have difficulty in preventing these occurrences from damaging local producers. 
Furthermore, there is already a strong South African presence in the Swazi market which may 
prove difficult to break. For example, the large OK supermarket chain and the Kentucky Fried 
Chicken fast food restaurants buy from South African suppliers. Since the managers of these 
outlets can reduce their transaction costs by simply ordering from established suppliers, there 
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is little incentive for them to purchase from local firms that have not yet demonstrated their 
capacity to consistently supply a good product at competitive prices. 
e. Access to capital 
Access to capital is an important factor in determining entry into large scale poultry 
production and in shaping the structure of the production and marketing systems found in the 
subsector. Only those firms with access to a large amount of long-term capital can consider 
developing large integrated broiler and layer operations. Only those firms with large amounts 
of working capital can develop marketing systems in which they regularly deliver their products 
and grant suppliers credit to their buyers. Swaziland is at a disadvantage in that it does not have 
a venture capital fund or a well functioning investment promotion program to facilitate 
matchmaking between foreign and domestic investors. 
The local financial institutions, including SIDC, can be expected to fmance some larger 
scale operations for producers with significant equity participation and recognized management 
ability. They will not likely be good sources, however, of start-up loans for low equity 
entrepreneurs with limited experience in the sub sector. The loan guarantee fund will not improve 
access to commercial loans for many of these entrepreneurs. Besides its current constraints, the 
general problem is that evaluations of loan guarantee funds in other countries suggest that they 
have little impact on increasing the supply of loans for projects or borrowers that lenders 
perceive as being highly risky. 18 Therefore, limited equity entrepreneurs generally must rely 
on informal financial sources to augment equity funds. South African agriculture, on the other 
hand, has received a large amount of subsidized long-term credit which probably contributed to 
developing a large, capital intensive, integrated poultry industry. 
Donors have helped alleviate perceived capital constraints in the financial system by 
channeling funds for on-lending through the SDSB, but the high delinquency and default rates 
it has experienced in the past discourages use of this alternative in the future. Donor and NGO 
projects, however, also have problems of sustainability as discussed in the following section. 
4. Sustainability of Innovative Sponsored Projects 
A frequent problem faced in donor sponsored projects is the difficulty of sustaining a 
project especially after donor support ends. That problem potentially exists in the poultry 
subsector. Of the several donor sponsored projects that support poultry, the most ambitious and 
technically advanced is that given through the a U.S./Israeli funded development project. The 
Israeli poultry expert, Shlomo Y erushalmi, is heavily involved in developing the Shibani poultry 
project. It involves a central cooperative facility with 2,000 caged laying hens linked to 27 
individual women farmers who each have an average of 100 layers in their individual household 
operations. An additional twenty or so women expect to start production in the next four months. 
18 See; for example, Levitsky and Prasad. 
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The project has about 150 total members, all of whom are women. About 80% have paid up 
membership shares of E250 each. 
Construction of the coop's central facility began in May, 1993, and egg production 
started in November. The central facility has seven paid employees. The project truck 
periodically picks up the individual members' egg production and drops off feed supplies. The 
feed is purchased in truckload lots and is sold to members and nonmembers for a small markup 
over cost. All eggs produced in the central facility and by the individual members are graded 
by size, and payment is made according to the quantity of each size produced. About 90 percent 
of the total production is sold and delivered to 14 local customers (hotels, retailers, etc.) on a 
fixed schedule. The individual members periodically come to the central facility to contribute 
labor and to pick up payments for their eggs. 
The design of the central facility and the individual member units, the selection of feed 
rations, and the development of the production and marketing plans can be attributed in large 
part to the Israeli expert. The Ministry of Agriculture provides poultry and cooperative 
development extension agents at no charge to support the project. The project's total investment 
cost was just over E300,000. It was funded mostly by funds provided by the Israeli government 
and the joint Israeli and U.S. technical assistance program. A revolving loan was created to 
finance the members' installation costs that average E3,000. These member loans are to be 
repaid over 18 months after the layers start production with a two months grace period. The 
members provide the land and construct their individual laying houses. The members also 
contributed their labor to help build the centre's facilities. 
To date, the project appears to be successful. Egg production per hen is high in both the 
central facility and member flocks, diseases have been controlled and death rates are low. 
Careful feed procurement and direct sales to local purchasers appear to have produced good 
profit margins. The individual members appear to be enthusiastic and some 20 members are 
waiting to start their individual operations. The project so far seems to have validated the basic 
model in which some economies of scale are reached in production and marketing by linking the 
members' production with the central facility. In a sense the project operates much like a 
commercial outgrower scheme found in other countries in large scale poultry operations, except 
here the members in theory control the entire system and share in the coop's profits. 
This project reflects an important dilemma of many donor activities; that is, how to 
sustain it without heavy donor input. There is an obvious role for donors in trying to design 
innovative approaches to solve development problems. But the challenge is to design projects 
which are sustainable when the heavy donor inputs and subsidies are removed. No 
comprehensive analysis has yet been conducted to determine the long-term financial viability of 
this poultry project. Some of the most important issues are fmancial. They include questions 
such as: Is the truck and other equipment being adequately depreciated so they can be 
eventually replaced? Are cash reserves being accumulated to purchase new point of lay pullets 
when the current hens need to be culled, and to help additional members start production? 
Finally, there are important questions of integrity in the management of the financial affairs of 
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any group activity. For instance, the snnilar Khutsala cooperative poultry proJect, irutiated in 
1988 with 4,000 layers which has now grown to 25,000 hens, apparently operated well for 
several months without foreign assistance but is now reported to be missing some E90,000. It 
is not clear if these funds were stolen, or if they represent operatmg losses. 
The problem is that although the project design may be sound, it is complicated and 
requires considerable technical and managerial input by someone qualified, in this case the 
Israeli expert. It is questionable if in a short period of time the members will be able to acquire 
the skills and discipline required to maintain the project once the technical assistance is 
withdrawn. It is doubtful if the coop and poultry extension agents, with their governmental 
constraints and lack of incentives, will become effective substitutes for the Israeli expert. 
There are at least two alternative approaches that might exploit the positive technical 
features of the project's basic design while improving its chances of sustainability. The first is 
to investigate improving its management capacity by hiring a person or fmn to take over day-to-
day management. Utilizing a profit-sharing contract might provide the incentives necessary for 
careful management. This approach would demonstrate to the members the cost of good 
management and would clarify the financial viability of the design. A second alternative would 
be to convert the entire model into a private outgrower scheme as a type of franchising 
arrangement in which additional units would be located throughout the country wherever a large 
enough local niche market exists. This approach would introduce private sector discipline into 
the entire operation. The characteristics of the broiler outgrower scheme now being developed 
should be studied for possible insights into how to design outgrower contracts so that all parties 
are motivated to make the project succeed. 
V. Financial Services for the Horticultural and Poultry Subsectors 
Swaziland does not have a well-developed rural financial system with the capacity to 
effectively screen borrowers, monitor loans, and recover most of the funds lent. The country has 
pursued some of the supply leading credit policies often used in Sub-Saharan African countries 
during the last two decades to try to encourage greater formal lending to agriculture. 19 Much 
of the agricultural lending has been done by the Swaziland Development and Saving Bank 
(SDSB) and donors have been an important source of the funds lent. The commercial banks 
generally restrict their lending to the largest farms. Formal bank loans are available for only the 
largest producers of horticultural and poultry products. As a result, much of the funding used 
to fmance these two subsectors is equity capital and informal loans. Some large firms are 
organized as corporations and receive a sufficient amount of resources as director loans. This 
section provides an overview of the fmancial system and how formal and informal finance 
supports these two subsectors. The fmancial institutions were reluctant to supply information 
about their operations so little quantitative analysis could be conducted. 
19 For a regional summary of rural financial markets, see Meyer et al., 1992. 
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1. Formal Financial Agents and Loan Guarantees 
The country has a total of five commercial banks plus several non-bank formal 
institutions including the Swaziland Industrial Development Company (SIDC), Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC), International Finance Corporation (IFC), The Netherlands 
Development Finance Company, The European Investment Bank, and The Swaziland Business 
Growth Trust (SBGT). The majority of the loans made by these formal institutions, however, 
go to non-agricultural businesses. Of the total loans and advances made in 1992 by these formal 
institutions, the agricultural sector share was only 8.4% (Central Bank, 1993). Roughly two-
thirds of the lending by banks to agriculture is done using the overdraft system which places a 
premium on having had well established business relations with a bank before seeking a loan. 
Furthermore, even overdrafts are usually fully collateralized so farmers are at a disadvantage 
if they have few assets acceptable as collateral. Participants in donor supported projects may get 
loans or credit in kind for building installations, buying equipment, or purchasing poultry. 
A. Private Commercial Banks 
The four private commercial banks-Barclays, Meridien Biao, Stanbic, and Standard 
Chartered-believe they play an important role in financing agriculture but it is limited to 
serving large and corporate farms. They tend to have long standing relationships with these 
firms. For example, roughly 10% of Stanbic's total portfolio is agricultural of which 
approximately half is concentrated in the citrus and sugar cane sectors. The Standard Chartered 
agricultural portfolio may only reach five percent of total lending, and the pineapple subsector 
may represent more than half of it. Likewise, about a third of Barclays agricultural lending is 
in the sugar sub sector. Historically, Stanbic has had a large leasing program, so undoubtedly 
some of its truck leases have gone to traders and producers in the horticulture and poultry 
subsector. This probably occurs in the other banks as well so the market share reportedly 
devoted to agriculture is understated. Leasing is regarded as a fairly good business because of 
the relative ease in recovering the collateral in case of default. 
All four banks viewed small farmer lending as costly and risky. None of them saw the 
Central Bank guarantee programs as very effective means to reduce their lending risk. As a 
result, they report very few loans made to small scale producers. One bank reported one poultry 
loan that was in partial default. Many of the smaller loans are made on an overdraft basis in 
sizes as small as E2,500 to 3,000. Each account is reviewed annually, and a ceiling and 
collateral requirements are established for the year. 
Interest rates are set at prime plus several percentage points which represent the risk 
premium attached to the specific borrower or project. All the banks report a preference to do 
business with borrowers who have an established business and a record of transactions with the 
bank rather than fmance new business start-ups with new customers. All four banks believed that 
their delinquencies and defaults were reasonably low, but there was a recognition that their large 
exposures with individual businesses, such as pineapple processing, makes them vulnerable to 
potential losses if that business runs into difficulty. 
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Only one bank reported working with a NGO in which the NGO retailed loans to its 
members after receiving a wholesale loan from the bank. This approach is being experimented 
with in other developing countries and merits greater consideration in Swaziland. It may offer 
an opportunity for the banks to more fully fulfill their social obligations for lending to lower 
income people yet pass on some of the lending costs and risks to the NGO. 
B. SDSB 
The majority of agricultural lending from formal financial institutions to smaller scale 
customers is done by SDSB, a parastatal that advocates targeted credit to agriculture at 
subsidized interest rates. The majority of funds for its credit programs are provided as grants 
from several international agencies including EDF, IFAD, WID of World Bank and ADB. The 
nominal annual interest rates charged for agricultural loans range from 14.25% to 20% 
compared to prime plus 5-6% (about 20- 21.5%) at other commercial banks. Currently, SDSB 
is experimenting with group loans to vegetable growers, and the repayment rates are expected 
to be higher than loans to individual maize growers. The group lending approach is reported to 
have increased access to formal loans for women who otherwise need collateral and the consent 
of their husbands to secure loans (SDSB annual report, 1993). 
The most important problem for SDSB is that it is perceived as a political lending institu-
tion rather than as a viable ban1c The bank is subject to political pressure concerning decisions 
about who to lend to and who to collect from. Donors use it as a channel to lend funds to their 
targeted beneficiaries. Although they are concerned about the banks' viability, one gets the 
impression that speedy disbursement to meet project objectives is a more important concern. 
This situation contributes to serious loan recovery problems. An African Development Bank line 
of credit used to finance fruit and vegetable producers is reported to be experiencing low re-
covery now. A few layer and broiler loans have also been made by SDSB and the recovery rate 
in the early phases of these loans is reportedly close to zero percent. For regular commercial 
lending, low recovery rates for loans made to specific subsectors would be indicative that they 
represent risky areas in which to lend. Given the circumstances of the SDSB, however, that is 
too simplistic an interpretation in this case. Indeed, lending to the horticultural and poultry 
sub sectors may be risky, but other data are needed to support that argument. 
C. SBGT 
The SBGT has the potential to become an important source of financial services for 
horticultural and poultry sectors. It was established in 1992 with the fmancial and technical 
assistance of USAID to stimulate the growth of established Swazi small businesses to create 
employment and generate income. SBGT provides services including marketing, construction and 
business planning while its subsidiary, the Growth Trust Corporation (GTC), provides business 
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and housing loans. 20 All loan applicants are mandated to take business planning services at 
SBGT to prepare cash flow statements used in the application for GTC loans. 
GTC offers loans at about 33% per annum for business growth, working capital, 
franchising, purchase of equipment, discounting invoices and housing projects. Only established 
firms are financed. Business growth loans, called class A loans, are 90 day working capital loans 
offered at the prime rate plus 18% with a loan processing fee of 10%. The line of credit for 
eligible borrowers starts at E2,000, increases by E1,500 every quarter based on repayment 
performance until the borrowers reach a maximum of E7 ,500. The working capital loans, called 
class B loans, are made for longer periods at an annual interest rate of prime plus 10% and a 
two percent loan processing fee. Loan size ranges from E5,000 to E35,000. These loans are 
usually offered to Class A graduates to expand their businesses. The franchise financing loans 
are basically equity fmancing loans made for a period of 48 months in the range of E20,000-
150,000 to cover start-up costs and franchising fees. Equipment loans fmance production and 
the purchase of equipment in amounts from E5,000 to E35,000 for a period of 12 months at a 
prime plus 8-10% annual interest rate. Invoice or bridge fmancing is used to discount specific 
invoices to small business owners who need to borrow because they have capital tied up in 
orders delivered but not yet paid. Accounts receivable from reputable businesses qualify for a 
90 day loan but can be rolled over for up to 180 days. The interest rate is prime plus 10%. 
Housing loans are offered for home acquisition and improvements to borrowers with access to 
title deed lands (SBGT business plans, 1994). 
From October 1992 to June 1994, a total of 909 individuals have received GTC loans. 
The project design assures that women entrepreneurs represent at least 30% of the loan portfolio. 
Of the total909 clients, 550 were male and 359 were female (61% and 39%, respectively). The 
majority of the clients (82%) were Swazis while the rest had temporary residence permits. The 
primary clients were traders and microentrepreneurs who employ less than five persons for their 
businesses (about 14% have no employees) including sewing, metal work, construction, wood 
processing, handicrafts and pottery, hair dressing and engineering services. While 156 fmns 
(17% of the total) were at least nine years old, 538 (59% of the total) were started after 1990. 
The majority of the clients (69%) were thirty years old, and 62% were married. 76% of the 
clients owned their businesses and the rest were co-owners. The majority of their clients (57%) 
were first time formal institution borrowers; only 43% of their clients reported accessing loans 
from other fmancial institutions including SIDC, SDSB, commercial banks and credit unions 
prior to borrowing from SBGT. Nearly 75% of the clients took loans to expand their existing 
businesses, while 25% added a new business to the existing one. There was careful screening 
of applicants. For example, out of 1,338 applicants during October 1992 to May 1994, only 852 
(64% of the applicants: 61% male and 68% female) were accepted for loans. In 1994, the appro-
val rate was 68% of the total applicants (63% male and 73% female). The reasons for rejection 
included no existing business or employees or permanent place of operation. Generally, the ap-
20 Although SBGT is a non-profit institution, its subsidiary, the Growth Trust Corporation 
(GTC), offers fmancial services on a for profit basis. 
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plicants first priority was to get a loan followed by market information, but only a few requested 
services such as technical training and assistance in starting new businesses (SBGT statistics, 
1994). 
The GTC loans to the poultry and horticultural subsectors were, however, insignificant. 
Of the 909 clients serviced during the project period October 1992 to May 1994, only 23 and 
38 were in the poultry and horticultural subsectors, respectively. In 1994, a total of 245 clients 
received 478 loans. Of this, six with 14 loans and nine with 21 loans were from the poultry and 
horticultural subsectors, respectively. Of the total volume of loans issued by SBGT in 1994, 
loans to poultry and horticultural subsectors accounted for only two percent and four percent, 
respectively. The poultry and horticultural loans recorded repayment rates of 89 and 83% , 
respectively, compared to 95% for other sectors (SBGT statistics, 1994). Delinquent loans are 
defined as 90 or 95 more days past due. 
SBGT is planning a geographic expansion into rural areas in 1994. Rural expansion 
should result in more agri-business loan applications. These may be higher risk loans, especially 
if the activities are outside of SBGT's expertise. Therefore, it is essential for SBGT to evaluate 
its strengths and weaknesses in devising appropriate financial instruments for rural areas. Smart 
cards that cost E35/card are an innovative fmancial instrument introduced by GTC to finance 
small businesses. The loan amount is electronically encoded into a card that can be used in any 
smart card machine installed in local commercial banks. A comprehensive statement on bank 
transactions is submitted to GTC for borrower monitoring by a full time MIS officer. Borrowers 
can make partial withdrawals and payments into their account using the smart card. The smart 
card users are indeed smart; some borrowers reported immediately withdrawing their loans in 
full to transfer into their savings account or to onlend to others to earn interest so that the 
effective interest rate on their loans can be reduced. Smart cards are especially useful to those 
without a savings account in a bank, and to repeat borrowers. 
Although GTC is registered as a fmancial institution, it has not yet been authorized by 
the Central Bank to mobilize deposits. Therefore, it primarily depends on loans and overdrafts 
from other financial institutions and, to a lesser extent on donor funds, fees and interest earnings 
to run its credit program to service high risk borrowers. Transaction costs are high, especially 
in terms of screening and monitoring clients.21 With a default rate of 5%, SBGT can just break 
even with the current portfolio and clients (SBGT: Business Plan, 1994). The current repayment 
21 It is estimated that about ten hours are spent on screening and monitoring each client who 
took a business growth loan. This represented a cost of about E1,200 per client. With an 
additional E125 in administration cost, each client costs about E1,325 for a loan that ranges in 
size from E2,000 to 7,500 and has a term of 90 days. With an interest rate of 33% per annum, 
SBGT can earn a revenue of E2, 935 per client if (s)he remains in the program for one year. 
It was reported, however, that out of six group loans with 33 clients made under business growth 
category (class A), only 18 (55%) applied for a higher loan size in that category (SBGT 
interviews}. 
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rate is reported to be around 95% . There is a need to expand the portfolio and clients in order 
for the program to become sustainable. 
It would be difficult for GTC to increase its revenue by making more poultry and horti-
cultural loans to small producers. The transaction and risk costs involved in servicing these 
clients cannot be covered with the current interest rate. The interest rate cannot, however, be 
increased beyond the current 33% without potentially attracting a very risky clientele. 
Experiments could be conducted, however, in providing small business growth loans to poultry 
cooperative members based on a guarantee from the cooperative, and in lending to small 
horticultural producers guaranteed by market agents or large farmers. While some argue that 
strengthening small business enterprises through the provision of equity capital is premature for 
young enterprises, it is, nonetheless, a potentially viable option. 
D. SIDC 
It is considering supporting a new project for a 8,000 hen laying operation and the project 
for the new broiler slaughter plant. 
E. Guarantee Schemes 
To increase the flow of formal credit to risky sectors including exporters and small 
businesses, the Government of Swaziland established in the Central Bank the following: (i) the 
Small-Scale Enterprise Loan Guarantee Scheme, (ii) the Export Finance Loan Guarantee 
Scheme, and (iii) a refinance window for commercial bank financing of exporters. The refinance 
facility allows commercial banks that experience liquidity problems to rediscount loan papers 
guaranteed under the export finance scheme with the Central Bank at the rediscount rate. The 
Export Finance Guarantee Scheme guarantees up to 75% and 85% of pre-shipment and post-
shipment loans, respectively. Only about 0.9% and 1.3% of total exports in 1992 and 1993, 
respectively, were covered under this scheme (Central Bank, 1993). Coverage for the 
horticultural and poultry subsectors has been negligible. Although the actual defaults on loans 
guaranteed through these schemes have been reported to be low, large provisions have been 
made for future losses which implies the risky nature of the enterprises financed. The 
commercial banks are reluctant to utilize the guarantee facilities because they can obtain 100% 
collateral from their borrowers compared to only a 75-85% coverage from the guarantees. In 
addition, participation in the schemes and the settlement of claims have involved tedious and 
expensive procedures. In summary, there appears to be little additionality due to these schemes 
in terms of an increased number of loans made or larger sized loans made to risky enterprises. 
The small role played by formal finance has induced semi-formal and informal fmancial 
agents to service the horticultural sector. 
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2. Semi-formal Financial Agents 
Some 44 NGOs are registered with the Coordinating Assembly of Non-Governmental 
Organizations (CAN GO), and approximately 13 are actively engaged in promoting horticultural 
production and seven in poultry. Four NGOs are reported to offer fmancial services, such as 
loans and deposit mobilization, but the number of horticultural and poultry producers served by 
them is reported to be small. In addition, the European Development Foundation (EDF) provides 
infrastructure grants under its microprojects scheme to form community gardens and establish 
small poultry units. An evaluation of EDF microprojects showed that the majority of their 
nonperforming projects were poultry and piggery units due to transport, financial and 
management problems (Oates, 1994). 
3. Informal Financial Agents 
Rotating Savings and Credit Associations (RoSCAs) called Luholiswane in Siswati are 
commonly found among market women selling horticultural products. Suppliers credit is also 
commonly granted by producers that supply hotels, supermarkets, and by retailers to a small 
group of their regular clientele. However, small producers seldom extend credit to their trader 
buyers. They prefer to sell on a cash basis in the spot markets. However, they are mandated to 
sell on consignment when trading through market agents at SFPM. Credit through outgrower 
schemes is also very rare in the horticultural subsector. The few existing outgrower schemes 
only guarantee a market outlet and seldom provide any inputs for production. 
In the poultry sub sector, there is a fair amount of informal finance in the form of 
suppliers credit granted to customers who make large purchases and have well established 
business relationships with the suppliers. The larger farmers are able to obtain 15-30 day credit 
from feed suppliers. These producers, in tum, assure a steady supply of their products to their 
best customers and accept deferred payment. Hotels and supermarkets usually purchase from 
sources that allow them to pay within 30 days of delivery, but smaller wholesalers/retailers and 
hawkers normally have to pay cash for their purchases regardless of source. The granting of 
credit by producers means that they are financing the flow of commodities within the marketing 
system. There were no reports of forward contracting in which the purchaser provides funding 
for products to be delivered at a future date. 
VI. Conclusions and Recommendations 
Many of the economic development problems faced by Swaziland must be dealt with 
regionally because they involve economic relations with South Africa. If the entire Southern 
African region was a single country, some of the wide intra-regional disparities would be 
resolved through migration and economic development. Specific regional investment strategies 
could be employed to further reduce intra-regional employment and income differences. Now 
these problems can only be dealt with through negotiations on issues such as dumping, trade 
regulations, and investment policies. These negotiations can try to at least level the playing field 
for private enterprise competition. 
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Swaziland needs to evaluate what it can effectively do to stimulate the horticultural and 
poultry subsectors. Opportunities exist to increase the production and marketing of fresh fruits, 
vegetables and poultry products. The fact that the country is a net importer of these products 
means that a market is available if local production can compete in price, quality and reliability. 
The difficulty for Swazi producers is that they are located adjacent to a more advanced nation 
which can supply the Swazi market with many products at competitive prices. Although 
Swaziland has ready access to many of the production technologies and inputs used in South 
Africa, transportation costs and limitations in entrepreneurial and managerial capabilities retard 
their adoption. Efforts must be directed at providing good general support services, and 
exploiting market niches where Swazi producers have the best chance of competing. 
The following areas should be explored for government action, and some may be 
appropriate for private sector initiatives and/or donor support. 
1. Provision of Public Goods 
The government needs to concentrate on providing those public goods that clearly fall 
within the public sector, and that are supportive of all producers. Chief among these are research 
and extension. Research is required to identify the enterprises, the specific crop varieties, and 
the livestock and poultry breeds most appropriate for Swazi production conditions, and for which 
there is the best domestic and export market potential. Producers must develop confidence that 
they will find good information in government offices when they wish to make investment 
decisions or face production and marketing problems. Carefully targeted support for extension 
is required so that specific problems of the subsectors are addressed. Activities such as the 
USAID CAPM project and the Israeli poultry project need to be internalized so their continuity 
is assured after donor support ends. The government needs to support the development and 
enforcement of grades and quality standards to prevent inferior quality products from entering 
the market and creating a bad image for Swazi producers. Some of this governmental support 
may need to be channeled into unique research for Swaziland, but the country may also be able 
to borrow heavily from research conducted in South Africa and elsewhere. 
On the other hand, the government needs to be selective in choosing what to actually 
operate as a public enterprise versus simply regulating the actions of private agents. For 
example, perhaps the government hatchery should be leased or sold to private agents to avoid 
the current situation whereby it sits idle because government funds are unavailable to acquire 
a new breeding flock. Furthermore, the government needs to carefully assess the 
recommendations to be made in the Coopers & Lybrand report contracted by NAMBOARD. 
NAMBOARD may have to be redesigned and reconstructed so it is assigned a mission more 
consistent with its capacity. Currently it appears to operate more as a taxing body than as an 
effective agency for trade protection. 
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2. Special Studies and Training 
There are two special studies that the government should undertake or contract for to 
clarify specific issues in the horticultural and poultry subsectors. First, analysis is incomplete 
about the returns that have been or can be expected from certain enterprises. For example, there 
is limited good data for use in making robust estimates about what CAPM farmers actually earn 
through selling through packhouses and additional farm gate sales. There are no good analyses 
of the possible returns to be earned from various sizes of poultry operations. Operations in other 
countries suggest there are large economies of scale. However, smaller scale and cooperative 
operations, such as the Shibani cooperative, may offer a way to achieve good returns by 
combining centralized feed purchasing with individual small flock production units which use 
lower cost household resources. Such analyses should also consider the feasibility of creating 
a franchisable egg production system which the private sector could duplicate around the country 
wherever appropriate niche markets exist. Models for financing individual small producers could 
be developed for which the lenders would have some assurance that loan payments would be 
made through deductions from sales proceeds. 
A second study is needed to clarify the possibilities for and constraints on the greater use 
of subcontracting and outgrower schemes. They are used in the country for growing cotton and 
sugarcane, but are not as widely used as in Kenya and Zimbabwe for horticulture and poultry. 
They often combine the advantages of large farmer expertise and access to markets with the use 
of small farmer labor and land. The small farmer subcontractors are often considered 
creditworthy by banks because of their assured access to markets. The study should identify if 
there are some things the government could do to facilitate the greater use of these production 
systems. A specific concern is the design of contracts that will encourage all parties to 
successfully fulfill them. 22 
The lack of good management was consistently identified in the interviews as one of the 
chief constraints of Swazi agriculture. Additional management training could be an important 
contribution made by the government. Such training might be particularly effective for persons 
entering into outgrowing schemes, and might influence large producers to select outgrowers 
rather than use hired labor to expand own production. 
3. Stimulating Investments in the Subsectors 
Much of the equity capital and expertise required for large integrated poultry production 
systems must come from foreign sources, but Swaziland does not have an efficient system of 
investment promotion to attract foreign investors. Attracting investment is an increasingly 
competitive undertaking because many countries are developing one-stop investment centers. 
Furthermore, the recent political changes in South Africa have improved that country's image 
for investors contemplating investing in Southern Africa. 
22 For a recent publication on contract farming, see the study by Little and Watts. 
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The best alternative for increasing foreign investments in horticulture and poultry is likely 
to be through encouraging established South African firms to set up subsidiary operations and 
joint ventures in Swaziland. The second alternative is to work with medium sized local 
entrepreneurs, many of whom will probably be white farmers with some land and other 
resources, and encourage them to develop outgrower schemes for horticultural and poultry 
operations. An investment promotion strategy is needed in which specific persons and firms are 
targeted for assistance. USAID funded projects, such as EPADU in Uganda and KEDS in 
Kenya, offer ideas about how the private sector can be assisted through donor and government 
support to expand horticultural production and exports. 
4. Formal Sector Lending 
The formal banking system must be cautious about lending to these two subsectors be-
cause of the high transaction costs and risks involved. The risks take several forms. First, there 
is considerable production risk associated with producing horticultural and poultry products. 
They generally require more skilled management than do the traditional grain crops and livestock 
enterprises. Furthermore, since these are relatively new products for most producers, they do 
not have much accumulated experience to draw upon, and the existing research and extension 
services offer relatively little help. Second, the marketing channels are not well developed so 
that neither the producers nor the lenders can predict future prices and profits with great certain-
ty. Since these products are fairly perishable, careful post-harvest handling and timely marketing 
are critical. Third, the total operating costs required to grow a small area of vegetables are 
relatively low if family labor is used, so average loan size per borrower for working capital is 
likely to be small. This implies high transaction costs for the lenders. 
Three strategies should be pursued that could make formal lending more viable. First, 
if contract grower schemes can be expanded so that small farmers are linked with large farmers 
who have better management skills and access to markets, the production and market risks 
should fall and lenders should be more eager to lend. Second, a small scale poultry subcontract-
ing scheme might be patterned after the Shibani Cooperative if it proves to be fmancially viable. 
This scheme might be replicated throughout the country wherever a large enough niche market 
exists. The risk of lending might be reduced by, say, having one of the commercial banks make 
long term loans for the buildings and equipment, and having SBGT or another lender make 
working capital loans for the cooperative and for the individual members. SBGT or other lenders 
might also be able to develop attractive lease/purchase programs for simple equipment, 
machinery and vehicles for which there is strong demand in the second-hand market. 
The third strategy involves an experiment underway in South Africa. The Development 
Bank of Southern Africa has provided seed capital for an experiment that merits monitoring for 
possible adoption in Swaziland. The DBSA has provided funds to a South African NGO to ex-
periment with designing a small scale poultry slaughtering plant that could be prefabricated in 
a used sea freight container, then hauled to and installed in a market town where a sufficient 
number of chickens are being slaughtered to make it feasible to upgrade to a more modem pro-
cessing plant. If this design proves to be fmancially sound, it could be copied in Swaziland and 
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would represent a type of agribusiness that SBGT or another lender might fmd attractive to 
fmance. 
5. Producer Associations 
There are two important actions that the private sector must take to enhance the prospects 
of successful expansion of these two subsectors. The first involves the formal or informal associ-
ation of farmers so that through group or cooperative ventures they can purchase inputs in bulk, 
negotiate marketing contracts, advertise their products, buy and use machinery and equipment, 
and share costs such as veterinary services. A second area concerns group action to assure 
quality of production. To build up reliable markets, producers must assure buyers of a reliable 
supply of good quality products. However, there will always be producers who will attempt to 
engage in opportunistic behavior by shipping poor quality products, and such events have a 
negative spillover into the entire subsector. A mechanism, such as an association, is needed with 
sufficient enforcement powers to inspect individual shipments and prohibit the export of poor 
quality products. This is not so urgent when producers ship to South African markets where 
inferior products are immediately discounted in the marketplace. It will become important, 
however, as the country tries to increase its penetration into European markets. 
6. Investments in Human Capital 
A complaint frequently reported in the interviews conducted for this study is the limited 
managerial capacity that exists in the country. The documents reviewed describe the country's 
lack of investment in human capital. This is probably the greatest long-term problem that the 
country must address. It is the most pervasive problem because it influences the possibility of 
Swaziland successfully competing in any subsector. Borrowers from financial institutions often 
resist training because they perceive that their primary need is to relax their financial constraints 
with a loan. Yet the greatest benefit that a borrower may receive from a lending institution is 
the training provided with a loan, because that may have more of an impact on the future growth 
and success of the firm than simply borrowing and paying back a loan. 
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Banking Sector 
PERSONS INTERVIEWED 
June 20 to July 8, 1994 
Mike French, Mgr. Advances, Barclays Bank 
MarkS. Teversham, Managing Director, Barclays Bank 
Vukani Mamba, Mgr., Development Finance, Central Bank of Swaziland 
Jean-Paul Ngameni, Sr. Mgr. Credit/Training, Meridien Biao 
John D. Johnston, Manager Credit, Stanbic Bank 
Nick Simpson, Head of Finance, Standard Chartered 
Mike Ogden, Credit Manager, Standard Chartered 
Doug McLean, Manager of Business Services, Swazi Business Growth Trust 
Comfort Dlamini, Credit Officer, Swazi Business Growth Trust 
Celiwe Dlamini, Business Services Consultant, Swazi Business Growth Trust 
Tladi Ramushu, Controller of Operations, Swaziland Industrial Dev. Co., Ltd. 
Lura Xaba, Sr. Operations Exec., Swaziland Industrial Dev. Co., Ltd. 
P. C. Fourie, Dept. Mgr., Rural & Ag. Dev., DBSA, RSA 
J. Basson, Divisional Mgr., Entrepreneurial Dev., DBSA, RSA 
Government Agencies 
George Day, Marketing Section, MOAC 
Sifiso Nyoni, Marketing Section, MOAC 
Duke Dube, Poultry Expert, MOAC 
Ntombi Simelane, Acting Poultry Manager, Mfumbuneni Poultry 
Farm 
International Agencies/NGOs 
Steve Goertz, Project Manager of CAPM, USAID 
Jamie Raile, Project Manager of SBGT, USAID 
Aylline L. Dlamini, Nat'l. Director, ACAT 
Doyle Grenoble, Chief of Party, CAPM 
Eugene McAvoy, Marketing/Organisation Specialist, CAPM Project 
Ezrom Dlamini, CAPM, Mkhovu 
Themba Magagula, CAPM, Mkhovu 
Sarah Dlamini, National Coordinator, The Coordinating 
Assembly of Nongovernmental Organisations 
Cathy Presland, Advisor, lmbita, Women's Finance Trust, NGO 
Dumisa Ndzimandze, Ass't Programme Coordinator, European Dev. Fund 
Peter Oates, Programme Adviser, Swaziland/European Union Microprojects 
Programme 
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John Pape, Swaziland Fanner Development Foundation 
Clive A. Nicholson, Exec. Dir., Farmer Foundation, RSA 
Shlomo Yerushalmi, Poultry Expert, Israel/Centre for Int'l Cooperation 
John Caracciolo, Team Leader, Richard Woodroofe & Assoc. 
Producers/Marketing Sector 
Richard Hulley, Owner, Farmer's Free Range Eggs 
Mariano Barajas, R. Gastaldi, Fruit and Veg. 
Prepackers, Fresh Produce Market 
C. M. Gule, Veg. Producer, Fresh Produce Market 
Alexander Hamilton, Veg. Producer, Fresh Produce Market 
Peter Thorne, Malendela Farms 
Vaugn Warp, farmer 
Jaap Breytenbach, owner of Family Fun 
Jonathan Mey, FEDICS 
Paulo Augusto Mavayeye, Mozambican trader 
Ronnie Naidu, Indian trader from South Africa selling in Mabane market 
Amanda Brossy, Bellami farms 
Sasta Piljek, Bellami farms 
Thuli Dlamini, wholesaler at Mbabane market 
Phineas Makama, wholesaler at Mbabane market 
Petros Dlamini, Chairman, Nguane Farmers Marketing, Import and Export 
Peter Dlamini, Agriculture Manager, Vuvulane Irrigated Farm 
Spensor Dlamini, Tibiyo Farms 
Andrew Dlamini, Shipping Manager, Swazican 
Dumile Sithole, Market Manager, NAMBOARD 
Peter Venter, Coopers & Lybrand, Johannesburg, Consultant to 
NAMBOARD 
Mark Ward, owner, Mountain Inn Hotel 
R.M. Mabila, Tetsembiso Investments, Veg.producer 
Aubrey Shongwe, Chief Executive Mgr., NAMBOARD 
Paul Davidson, Agent, Fresh Pac, Fresh Produce Market 
Flipy Zwart, Agent, Model, Durban Fresh Produce Market 
Brad Butler, Wholesaler, Durban Fresh Produce Market 
R.E. Naidu, Wholesaler, Durban Fresh Produce Market 
Sureen Bisnath, Wholesale Supplier of Fruits and Vegetables, Durban 
Sandro Gastaldi, R. Gastaldi, Pretoria Wholesale Market 
Deon, Jakaranda Markagente, Pretoria Wholesale Market 
Andreas Dlamini, Fruits and Vegetable controller, OK super market, Manzini 
Kobus Van Zyl, General Mgr., Swazi Feeds and Chicks 
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Anton Erasmus, Shareholder and Manager, Valley Fann Chickens 
and Tn-Cash 
Peter J. Hughes, Tambankulu Estates and Council Member, Swaziland Sugar 
Associatwn 
Dale Allen, fanner 
We also interviewed several fruits and vegetable retail traders and producers registered with the 
CAPM project 
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